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GHSA-q344-5v34-gm84
Impact
When @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp is run as an HTTP server (MCP_TRANSPORT=http), it reads the MCP_API_KEY environment variable and logs API key authentication enabled (X-API-Key header) at startup, but it never validated the X-API-Key header on incoming requests. The key was read into a variable and never enforced on the request path.
As a result, the /mcp endpoint accepted unauthenticated requests. Combined with the default bind address of 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces), any client able to reach the port could invoke every PDF tool and read the contents of any PDF the server process could open anywhere on the host. URL-based sources also enable limited SSRF (private/loopback addresses are blocked by default unless --allow-private-ips is set).
The misleading startup log made the exposure silent: an operator who set MCP_API_KEY reasonably believed the server was protected when it was not.
This affects only the opt-in HTTP transport; the default stdio transport is unaffected.
Patches
Fixed in @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp@3.0.1. The fix enforces the X-API-Key header with a constant-time comparison (rejecting missing/mismatched keys with HTTP 401), changes the default bind host to 127.0.0.1 (loopback), and emits a startup warning when binding a non-loopback host without an API key.
Workarounds
For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately:
- Bind to loopback only:
MCP_HTTP_HOST=127.0.0.1. - Place a reverse proxy in front that enforces authentication.
- Use the default
stdiotransport instead of HTTP. - Restrict filesystem reach with
--allow-dir/MCP_PDF_ALLOWED_DIRS.
Reported privately by novice-22 via responsible disclosure.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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