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GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p

HighCVSS 8.8 / 10
Published Oct 16, 2026·Last modified Oct 19, 2026
Affected Components(1)
Go logogithub.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2
< 2.6.0
Description

Summary

A user holding the delegated users:update permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. UpdateUser sets the target user's PasswordHash from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by RequireGlobalAdmin, users:update is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.

Root Cause

UpdateUser (handler backend/api/handlers/users.go:317-323) loads the target by ID and sets userModel.PasswordHash from the request body for any user, then userService.UpdateUser (user_service.go:174) simply tx.Saves — with NO actor-vs-target privilege comparison. The only IsGlobalAdmin guard (user_service.go:345) is a last-admin check inside DeleteUser, not the update path. Role assignment / role CRUD are RequireGlobalAdmin (backend/pkg/authz/permissions.go:27-33), proving users:update is intended below admin.

Impact

Complete administrator account takeover (C:H/I:H/A:H) by any holder of the delegated users:update permission.

Proof of Concept

  1. Admin delegates a custom "User Manager" role with users:update.
  2. PUT /users/{adminId} with {"password":"attacker123"}.
  3. POST /auth/login {"username":"arcane","password":"attacker123"} → admin session.

Attack Chain

  1. Action: admin delegates custom role with users:update. Guard: role creation is RequireGlobalAdmin. Bypass: intended delegation (holder is meant to manage profiles, not seize admin).
  2. Action: PUT /users/{adminId} {"password":"attacker123"}. Guard: RequirePermission(users:update) (users.go:154). Bypass: holder has it; no hierarchy check (users.go:317-323, user_service.go:174 unconditional Save).
  3. Action: POST /auth/login as admin → admin session.

Bypass Evidence

  • users.go:317-323 sets PasswordHash for any target; user_service.go:174-194 has no actor/target privilege comparison.
  • Only IsGlobalAdmin hits are DeleteUser's last-admin guard and DTO flags (grep).
  • users:update is org-level, held by no built-in non-admin role (permissions.go:24).

Affected Versions

<= 2.5.0.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

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Risk Scores
Base Score
8.8

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
8.1

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
0.37%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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