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GHSA-pppj-hq3g-57pj
No affected components available
JupyterLab 4.5+ allows notebook settings to be shared and applied through an overrides.json file using the Import button in the Settings Editor.
Certain notebook display settings were not properly validated before being applied. As a result, a crafted settings file could contain hidden instructions that run as code inside JupyterLab when imported, instead of only changing a display preference.
Because importing a settings file appears harmless, a user could import a file shared by another party without realizing it could do more. On multi-tenant file systems without proper permission control, another user could plant a malicious overrides.json.
CVE assignment pending, GitHub CNA is experiencing severe backlog
Impact
When a malicious settings file is applied, the embedded code runs with the same access as the affected user. This could allow an attacker to read or modify that user's notebooks and files, and to run code on the user's behalf through the notebook server, including on any connected kernel.
User Interaction vs Privileges Required
Write access to a loaded settings location
If an attacker can write to a directory JupyterLab loads settings from (e.g. on shared or multi-tenant file system), they could place a crafted overrides.json that is applied to another user automatically at startup. This requires high privilages but no action by the victim.
User-imported settings file
A user can import a crafted overrides.json through the Import button in the Settings Editor, having received it from another party. This requires no privileges but a deliberate action by the victim, who reasonably expects a settings file to change preferences rather than run code.
Patches
JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10 were patched.
Workarounds
None
Hardening
- Treat a settings file as something that can affect how JupyterLab behaves, not only how it appears. Administrators are encouraged to establish a trusted process for distributing configuration rather than relying on ad-hoc importing of shared files.
- On multi-tenant or shared file systems, restrict write permissions on the application settings directory and other Jupyter configuration paths so that one user cannot place an
overrides.json(or other configuration) readable by another user. A settings file in these locations is applied automatically, without an import step, so directory permissions are the primary control against cross-user tampering.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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