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GHSA-ph9c-7hw9-vhhw
Summary
When regex search mode is enabled in the JLine3 nano editor, the user-supplied
search term is compiled directly as a Java regular expression with no timeout or
backtracking bound. A crafted pattern such as (a+)+b can hang the editor session
thread at high CPU, causing a denial of service for that session.
Details
In builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java, the search implementation
uses Pattern.LITERAL only when regex mode is disabled. When regex mode is enabled,
the search term is compiled as a raw Java regex:
Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(
searchTerm,
(searchCaseSensitive ? 0 : Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE | Pattern.UNICODE_CASE)
| (searchRegexp ? 0 : Pattern.LITERAL));
This regex is then applied to buffer content. Because Java's regex engine is backtracking-based, nested-quantifier patterns can take exponential time on non-matching input.
Affected source location:
builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.javadoSearch(String text)
PoC
- Create a file containing a long run of
acharacters and open it in the JLine3nanoeditor. - Enable regex search mode with the editor's regex toggle.
- Start a search and enter the pattern
(a+)+b.
Expected result:
- The editor stops responding.
- The session thread consumes high CPU.
Reproduction environment:
- JLine3 on x86_64 Linux
- OpenJDK 25.0.2
Impact
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability caused by catastrophic regex backtracking.
Applications embedding org.jline:jline-builtins and exposing the nano editor are
impacted. In local use, the user can hang their own session. In remote multi-user
deployments, an attacker can occupy a server worker thread indefinitely.
Suggested Fix
The preferred fix for the current git head is to use a linear-time regex engine for regex search mode while preserving literal matching behavior when regex mode is off.
Suggested patch:
diff --git a/builtins/pom.xml b/builtins/pom.xml
--- a/builtins/pom.xml
+++ b/builtins/pom.xml
@@
<dependency>
+ <groupId>com.google.re2j</groupId>
+ <artifactId>re2j</artifactId>
+ <version>1.8</version>
+ </dependency>
+ <dependency>
<groupId>org.jline</groupId>
<artifactId>jline-reader</artifactId>
</dependency>
diff --git a/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java b/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java
--- a/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java
+++ b/builtins/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/Nano.java
@@
-import java.util.regex.Pattern;
+import com.google.re2j.Pattern;
If a dependency change is not acceptable, a fallback mitigation is to reject dangerous regex constructs or execute regex matching with a strict timeout, but that is weaker than replacing the backtracking engine.
Credits
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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