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GHSA-pfvm-w89x-94jw
Summary
TurnServer.ReceiveUdpAsync places its generic catch (Exception) OUTSIDE the while receive loop, and Start() launches the loop fire-and-forget with no supervision or restart. A single pre-authentication UDP datagram whose STUN header first byte is in 0x80–0xFF causes STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader to throw ApplicationException, which unwinds past the loop and terminates it. The TURN UDP relay is then dead for ALL clients until the process is restarted.
Root Cause
src/SIPSorcery/net/TURN/TurnServer.cs:
ReceiveUdpAsync(:555-577): the innertry(:562-567) wraps only_udpSocket.ReceiveAsync();HandleUdpDatagram(result.Buffer, result.RemoteEndPoint)(:569) is inside thewhilebody but OUTSIDE that inner try. The genericcatch (Exception ex)(:573) is lexically OUTSIDE thewhile.Start()does_ = ReceiveUdpAsync();(:381) — fire-and-forget, no restart.HandleUdpDatagram(:579) callsSTUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage(data, data.Length)(:600) for any non-ChannelData datagram;ParseSTUNMessage(STUNMessage.cs:94) has no try/catch.
Impact
ApplicationException propagates out of the while, is caught at :573, logged, and the method returns. _running remains true but nothing re-invokes ReceiveUdpAsync → TURN UDP relay permanently unavailable for all clients (whole-server DoS). Pre-authentication: STUN parsing precedes any TURN allocation/credential check.
Proof of Concept
Send one UDP datagram to the TURN port (default 3478) with first byte 0x80 (e.g. 80 00 00 00). 0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40 → not ChannelData → ParseSTUNMessage → ParseSTUNHeader executes if ((Array[startIndex] & 0xC0) != 0) throw new ApplicationException(...) (STUNHeader.cs:169-172); 0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0 → throws.
Attack Chain
- Entry: one UDP datagram to the TURN port, first byte
0x80–0xFF. Guard: ChannelData branch requires(data[0] & 0xC0) == 0x40(:583). Bypass:0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40→ falls through toParseSTUNMessage(:600). - Sink:
STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage→STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader(STUNHeader.cs:169-172) throwsApplicationException. Guard: none before the throw;ParseSTUNMessagehas no try/catch. Bypass:0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0→ throws. - Impact: exception unwinds past the
whileintocatch(Exception)at :573 → logged → method returns → loop exits. Guard: none — no restart (Start():381 fire-and-forget). Bypass: N/A. TURN UDP relay dead for all clients until process restart.
Bypass Evidence
- Loop/catch structure: catch at TurnServer.cs:573 is outside the
whileat :559;HandleUdpDatagramat :569 is outside the inner try (:562-567). - Unguarded
ParseSTUNMessageat :600; throw at STUNHeader.cs:169-172. - Fire-and-forget start at :381 with no restart in
Start(). TurnServerConfig.ListenAddressdefaults toIPAddress.Loopback(:42), but a functioning TURN server must bind a routable address to serve clients, so real deployments are exposed. Non-default config narrows the vulnerable population, not the attack difficulty → AC:L.
Affected Versions
nuget:SIPSorcery <= 10.0.13 (TurnServer component present since 10.0.5; verified on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD).
Dedup
NOT a duplicate of GHSA-28gm-jrmw-xx93 (CVE-2026-54632), which covers the client RTP/ICE socket (UdpReceiver/RTPChannel). TurnServer is a distinct shipped RFC 5766 server component with its own loop and fix location.
Suggested Fix
Wrap HandleUdpDatagram in a per-datagram try/log-and-continue INSIDE the while (matching the drop-and-continue intent of fix bdb76cb), and/or add loop supervision/restart.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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