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GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf
No affected components available
Summary
A flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client allows an attacker capable of performing a TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS (with channel binding) to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 (without channel binding), bypassing strict client-side enforcement policies.
Component Breakdown
This occurs due to a two-part failure in TlsServerEndpoint when a server presents an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm that lacks traditional WITH naming structures (such as Ed25519 or post-quantum algorithms):
- The internal hash derivation method fails to parse the algorithm name, swallows the resulting
NoSuchAlgorithmException, and silently returns an empty byte array via the deprecatedgetChannelBindingData()` API. - The client builder mistakenly interprets this empty byte array as an environmental absence of channel binding data rather than a cryptographic failure, falling back to non-channel-bound authentication.
Impact & Scope
This issue only impacts deployments where the downstream application layer explicitly enforces strict channel binding enforcement (e.g., channelBinding=require in pgJDBC).
Drivers operating under a "prefer" or "allow" policy (used by default) are structurally insulated from an unhandled exception since a fallback to standard SCRAM is within their expected configuration.
Remediation
Update your project configuration to pull in version 3.3 or later of the SCRAM library, which introduces strict exception propagation and explicit policy controls.
If you are interacting with the ScramClient builder API directly (e.g., writing a custom driver or database extension):
- Migrate Deprecated APIs: Stop using
TlsServerEndpoint.getChannelBindingData(). Transition immediately toTlsServerEndpoint.getChannelBindingHash(), which correctly propagatesNoSuchAlgorithmExceptionup the stack. - Adopt Explicit Policies: Leverage the newly introduced
ChannelBindingPolicyAPI during client construction. Do not rely on implicit parameter presence to dictate your security boundaries.
ScramClient client = ScramClient.builder()
.advertisedMechanisms(serverMechanisms)
.username(user)
.password(pass)
// Explicitly enforce strict boundaries if needed.
.channelBindingPolicy(ChannelBindingPolicy.REQUIRE)
.channelBinding(TlsServerEndpoint.TLS_SERVER_END_POINT, certHash)
.build();
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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