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GHSA-mwr2-wmgp-crj6

LowCVSS 2.3 / 10
Published Jun 19, 2026·Last modified Jun 19, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

A user that is granted namespace management (/sys/namespaces) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path "root" in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself.

Details

Several endpoints under /sys/namespaces/* accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or X-Vault-Namespace header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on.

Given the special namespace path "root" canonicalizes to en empty path (""), when passed as /sys/namespaces/root, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on /sys/namespaces/root within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead.

Impact

Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to:

  • Look up
  • Delete
  • Lock
  • Patch custom metadata

against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage sys/namespaces/root in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as /api-lock.

Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces.

Patch

This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5.

PoC

Start a development server:

bao server -dev

Create a namespace:

bao namespace create victim

This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of.

Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, inside of the victim namespace.

bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF
path "sys/namespaces/*" {
	capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"]
}
EOF

Then create a token with above policy attached:

export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token)

Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it:

bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root
Risk Scores
Base Score
2.3

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.

Threat Intelligence
0.6

Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Related Vulnerabilities
  • CVE-2026-55775
    Alias

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