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GHSA-mqcg-5x36-vfcg
No affected components available
JupyterLab's HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.
Impact
An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.
Single-click impact
An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can:
- execute arbitrary code in the available kernels,
- delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity,
- open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterHub deployments.
The arbitrary code execution will be immediately visible to the user; and can be halted by the timely user intervention. The deletion of files can be silent and go unnoticed for some time.
Multi-click attacks
An attacker who convinces the victim to click on multiple buttons in specific order and to grant access to clipboard (or in scenarios where the user already granted keyboard access) can obtain full access to the terminal and execute arbitrary commands in the environment with access scope that might exceed that of available kernels. Only users of Chromium-based browsers are susceptible to this expanded variant of the attack.
The execution of commands in the terminal would be immediately visible to the user.
Impact of third-party extensions
The impact described above assumes a plain JupyterLab/Notebook installation. In environments with frontend extensions that contribute additional commands the attack surface is increased by the functionality covered by these commands.
Patches
JupyterLab 4.5.7
Workarounds
No workarounds are available for end-users.
Downstream applications inheriting from JupyterFrontEnd or JupyterLab can effectively disable the CommandLinker by passing commandLinker: new CommandLinker({ commands: new CommandRegistry() }) option in the initialization options.
Hardening
The patched versions include a toggle to disable the command linker functionality altogether, for example via overrides.json:
{
"@jupyterlab/apputils-extension:sanitizer": {
"allowCommandLinker": false
}
}
Resources
- https://jupyterlab.readthedocs.io/en/latest/user/commands.html#commands-in-markdown-files
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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