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GHSA-m6wq-39m7-9xpp
Summary
Metalama loaded and executed compile-time assemblies, auxiliary executable tools, and embedded helper assemblies from predictable temporary directories. On Linux and macOS the default cache location was the world-writable system temporary directory (Path.GetTempPath(), i.e. /tmp), and previously-generated artifacts were trusted based on the presence of a sentinel/.completed marker file rather than on any integrity verification.
A local, unprivileged user on a shared machine or CI/build agent can pre-create the deterministic cache directory structure and plant a malicious DLL together with the matching sentinel file. When a higher-privileged user (or build/service account) subsequently runs a build, Metalama finds the sentinel, skips regeneration, and loads and executes the attacker-supplied assembly inside the compiler / IDE / MSBuild process.
Affected load-and-execute paths:
- the cache of compile-time assemblies that Metalama generates from your aspects;
- auxiliary executable tools that Metalama extracts to a local directory and then launches;
- embedded .NET helper assemblies that Metalama extracts to a local directory and loads into the build / IDE process.
Impact
Arbitrary code execution in the security context of the building user — i.e. a local privilege escalation across user accounts on shared POSIX systems (multi-user developer machines, CI/build agents). The attacker obtains code execution as the victim without holding the victim's privileges, and can read source/secrets, tamper with build output (supply-chain injection), or disrupt builds.
Affected configurations
- Linux and macOS, default configuration — affected. The shipped default uses the world-writable system temp directory.
- Windows, default configuration — not affected. The default per-user temporary directory is protected by OS ACLs, so cross-user planting is not possible.
- The
METALAMA_TEMPenvironment variable is a deployer-controlled override and is out of scope: pointing it at an insecure (e.g. world-writable or attacker-owned) location is a deployment misconfiguration, not a defect in the product.
Severity
CVSS v3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.2 (High) for the affected POSIX default configuration (Scope:Changed reflects the cross-user privilege escalation).
CVSS v4.0 cross-check: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:H/SA:H = 6.0 (Medium), which more granularly attributes low impact to the cache itself and high impact to the subsequent build process. The honest range is therefore Medium-High depending on the scoring model and platform.
Fix
Caches and extraction directories were relocated from the world-writable system temp directory to per-user application-data locations ($XDG_CACHE_HOME / ~/.cache/Metalama on POSIX), relying on OS-enforced per-user ownership as the trust boundary. Fixed in 2026.1.19.
Weaknesses
- CWE-377: Insecure Temporary File
- CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element
Affected packages
- Metalama.Framework < 2026.1.19,
- Metalama.Tool < 2026.1.19
Internal tracking: metalama/Metalama#1650.
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The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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