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GHSA-m5ph-mmg5-6w5h
Summary
The IPFS Pinning Service API implementation accepts a caller-controlled CID through POST /pins, queues background processing, and then recursively fetches the full DAG with helia.pins.add(cid). The route and background pinning path do not enforce a request rate limit, per-user quota, maximum DAG byte count, maximum block count, traversal timeout, or concurrent pinning limit.
An authenticated caller, or an unauthenticated caller when the server is started with ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true, can submit one or more pins whose CIDs resolve to very large DAGs. The server writes fetched blocks to CAR files under carStoragePath and can consume disk, network, CPU, and libp2p resources until the process or host becomes unavailable.
Details
POST /pins validates only that the request body contains a syntactically valid CID string, then forwards it to the pin store:
src/filecoin-pinning-server.ts:304-342accepts the request, parsescidwithCID.parse, and callspinStore.pin(request.user, cidObject, parsed.options).src/filecoin-pin-store.ts:153-188stores the pin asqueuedand schedules_processPinInBackgroundwithsetTimeout. There is no queue, semaphore, or global cap around this scheduling.src/filecoin-pin-store.ts:211-217creates a per-pin Helia node and forwards caller-suppliedorigins.src/filecoin-pin-store.ts:260-274walks the full DAG withfor await (const pinnedCid of helia.pins.add(cid)).src/create-pinning-helia.ts:47-80creates a libp2p/Helia node with the Bitswap block broker and no application-level resource limits.src/core/car/car-blockstore-base.ts:65-107writes every fetched block and updatesstats.totalSizeonly after writing.src/core/car/car-file-backend.ts:84-93streams blocks to the CAR writer on disk.
The Helia node created for each pin has no bootstrap or mDNS configuration (src/create-pinning-helia.ts:57). A public CID alone may therefore not be fetchable unless the node can reach a content source. In practice, the API also accepts origins, so an attacker can supply a reachable attacker-controlled libp2p origin that serves a large DAG and cause the server to retrieve it.
Impact
Successful exploitation affects availability:
- Disk exhaustion from unbounded CAR files in
carStoragePath. - Network exhaustion from recursive Bitswap retrieval.
- CPU and memory pressure from concurrent libp2p/Helia pin operations.
- Service degradation or process failure for other users of the daemon.
- Operational cost and manual recovery burden from large partial CAR files.
The default daemon configuration reduces exposure because the server binds to localhost and refuses to start without an access token unless ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true. The finding is most significant when the daemon is exposed beyond localhost, when the token is shared across untrusted users, or when the no-auth mode is enabled.
PoC
curl -X POST "https://target.example/pins" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"cid": "CID_OF_LARGE_DAG",
"origins": ["/ip4/203.0.113.10/tcp/4001/p2p/ATTACKER_PEER_ID"],
"meta": { "purpose": "resource-exhaustion-validation" }
}'
Submitting many such requests concurrently accelerates resource pressure because each request schedules independent background processing.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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