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GHSA-jqw5-w6h3-44g6
Summary
@apostrophecms/import-export's update-by-key feature lets an imported
document carry a <field>:key property (for example slug:key) whose
value is used to find an existing document to update instead of inserting
a new one. getUpdateKey()/insertOrUpdateDocWithKey()
(lib/methods/import.js) use that value directly as a MongoDB query value
with no laundering:
const matchingDraftPromise = manager.findForEditing(
req.clone({ mode: 'draft' }),
{
aposMode: 'draft',
[updateField]: doc[updateKey]
}).toObject();
Archive documents are parsed with EJSON (see lib/formats/gzip.js), which
revives objects such as { $ne: null } as live values, the same untrusted
data source and revival mechanism already fixed once in this module for
findSingletonAposDocId/findParkedAposDocId in GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3. That
fix did not touch insertOrUpdateDocWithKey, so the identical class of bug
survives here: a crafted "slug:key": { "$ne": null } entry in an
archive's aposDocs.json makes the import match (and then update) an
existing document the archive's author never actually identified, instead
of failing to find a match.
Impact
Reaching this requires only an authenticated session with import access to
the target type (the built-in contributor role holds this, matching the
precondition of GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3), and no admin interaction. Because the
match uses a MongoDB operator instead of an exact value, it is not limited
to a document the importer already knows the identifying field of: any
existing document the importer has generic edit rights on and that
satisfies the operator (which { $ne: null } trivially does for any doc
with a non-null value in that field) is a candidate, and Apostrophe's
findForEditing permission filter, not the update-key logic, is the only
thing narrowing which document actually gets matched and overwritten.
Live-verified: a contributor-role request importing a document containing
"slug:key": { "$ne": null } had its content applied to an existing,
unrelated draft article, overwriting its title, while the importer never
specified that article's real slug.
Affected versions
Confirmed on main branch HEAD as of 2026-09-04,
packages/import-export/lib/methods/import.js.
Suggested fix
Launder doc[updateKey] to a plain string (mirroring the fix already
applied to type/aposLocale/parkedId in GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3) before
using it as a query value, and fall back to the insert path when it is not
a usable string.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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