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GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7
com.powsybl/powsybl-computation-localImpact
Description
Both AbstractLocalCommandExecutor OS-dependent implementations are subject to CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), with a secondary CWE-88 (Argument Injection) concern via environment variables.
The local command executor build command strings via concatenation and executes them (through bash -c for Unix, or cmd /c for Windows). Any string argument or environment variable value reaching this executor can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell code as the JVM user.
The sink is reachable through public APIs that accept List<String> arguments without any documented indication that elements undergo shell interpretation.
Any caller — CLI, library integration, or embedding service — that forwards data from a less-trusted source into these APIs inherits the vulnerability.
Vulnerable elements
The vulnerable elements are:
- Public methods:
UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)LocalComputationManager.execute(...)ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run(...)ActionSimulatorTool.run(...)AmplModelRunner.run(...)AmplModelRunner.runAsync(...)
- itools commands:
action-simulator, when thetask-countoption is definedsecurity-analysis, when theexternaloption is defineddynamic-security-analysis
Characteristics
The vulnerability characteristics are the following:
- It allows arbitrary shell command execution as the JVM user (read, write, execute any file; spawn processes; exfiltrate data; etc.)
- There are multiple independent injection vectors within a single vulnerable call:
argselements (weakly escaped — bypassable via$(...), backticks, escaped quotes)- Environment variable values (unescaped — bypassable via
;,\n, or shell metacharacters)
- It is silent from the caller's perspective: the
List<String>API gives no indication that shell interpretation occurs. - It exposes downstream projects: any service embedding
powsybl-core(REST front-ends, pypowsybl tooling, multi-tenant grid analysis platforms) that exposes contingency IDs or computation parameters to external input is exploitable without needing to touch powsybl's code directly.
Am I impacted?
You are vulnerable if you make direct calls to one of the vulnerable end-user methods or itools commands listed in the "Vulnerable elements" section, with user-provided parameters, without controlling them.
Patches
com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local:7.2.2 and higher
Workarounds
If you cannot update your powsybl-computation-local version, you can check the content of the user-provided arguments when calling the vulnerable methods, by forbidding (if possible) the following characters:
- On Unix/Linux systems:
\,!,#,$,^,&,*,(,),{,},|,[,],\,;,\,",,,<,>,?,
- On Windows:
%,!,",\n,\r,^
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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