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GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr
An incomplete fix for GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37 (CVE-2025-66035) in @angular/common's HTTP Client (HttpClient) allows Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF) tokens to be leaked to attacker-controlled cross-origin domains when requests use URLs that exploit parsing discrepancies between regular expressions and the browser's WHATWG URL parser.
Technical Description
To address CVE-2025-66035, xsrfInterceptorFn introduced a regular expression (const ABSOLUTE_URL_REGEX = /^(?:https?:)?\/\//i) to detect and skip absolute and protocol-relative URLs before attaching the X-XSRF-TOKEN header.
However, browsers resolve request URLs passed to fetch() and XMLHttpRequest.open() using the WHATWG URL parser. For http: and https: schemes, the WHATWG URL standard performs several normalizations prior to resolving the authority/origin:
- Backslashes (
\) are treated as forward slashes (/) — e.g.,/\evil.example/x,\\evil.example/x,\/evil.example/x,https:\\evil.example/x,https:/\evil.example/x. - Leading and trailing C0 control characters and spaces (
<= 0x20) are stripped — e.g.,' //evil.example/x','\0//evil.example/x','\x1f//evil.example/x'. - ASCII tab (
\t), newline (\n), and carriage return (\r) characters are removed anywhere in the input — e.g.,'/\t/evil.example/x','/\n/evil.example/x','htt\tps://evil.example/x'.
Because these URLs do not match /^(?:https?:)?\/\//i, xsrfInterceptorFn treats them as relative same-origin URLs and attaches the X-XSRF-TOKEN header, while the browser resolves and dispatches the request to the cross-origin host (evil.example).
Note: Angular 21.0.3+ and 22.x replaced the regular expression with a WHATWG new URL(req.url, locationOrigin) origin comparison in #65683 and were already unaffected. However, the 20.3.x LTS branch retained the regular expression until 20.3.34.
Impact
The token leakage bypasses Angular's built-in XSRF protection on affected versions, allowing an attacker to capture the user's valid X-XSRF-TOKEN header if their server permits the request and custom header via CORS. Once obtained, the attacker can perform Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks against the victim user's session.
Attack Preconditions
- The victim's Angular application must have XSRF protection enabled (enabled by default in
HttpClient). - The attacker must be able to make the application send a state-changing HTTP request (e.g.,
POST,PUT,DELETE,PATCH) to a URL they control (such as/\attacker.example/apior//attacker.example/api).
Patches
The issue is resolved by parsing and comparing the request URL's origin against the application's current origin using the standard URL constructor (new URL(req.url, locationOrigin)).
21.0.3(and all22.xreleases)20.3.34
Workarounds
If you cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version:
- Validate and normalize outgoing request URLs using
new URL(url, window.location.origin)and verify thatparsedUrl.origin === window.location.originbefore passing dynamic URLs to mutatingHttpClientrequests. - Avoid passing untrusted or user-controlled URLs to
HttpClientmutating methods.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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