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GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m

HighCVSS 8.8 / 10
Published Jun 11, 2026·Last modified Jun 11, 2026
Affected Components(1)
Go logogithub.com/basekick-labs/arc
< 0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949
Description

Summary

Arc registers Go's net/http/pprof handlers at /debug/pprof/* via app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go, and /debug/pprof is added to PublicPrefixes in cmd/arc/main.go. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication.

Impact

Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can:

  • Fetch /debug/pprof/heap — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached *TokenInfo (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at auth.go:543).
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2 — leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths.
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N — pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request → minutes of server CPU).
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/trace — long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile.

No authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the seconds parameter.

Patches

https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1

Planned mitigation:

  1. Gate pprof registration behind an env var (ARC_DEBUG_PPROF=1) that defaults to off.
  2. When enabled, bind pprof to a separate localhost-only listener (127.0.0.1:6060 via dedicated net/http server) so it's never reachable from the public API port.
  3. Remove /debug/pprof from PublicPrefixes.
  4. Fix the HasPrefix bug where "/debug/pprofX" matches "/debug/pprof".

Workarounds

  • Block /debug/pprof* at a reverse proxy / load balancer in front of Arc.
  • Restrict Arc's API port to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
  • Patch the running build: comment out app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go and rebuild.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

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Risk Scores
Base Score
8.8

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.

Threat Intelligence
6.7

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.36%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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