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GHSA-hxf2-gm22-7vcm
No affected components available
Summary
The configuration API endpoint (/api/configuration/{name}) validated
configuration names using a blacklist approach that checked for \, /, ..,
and trailing .. This could potentially be bypassed using URL-encoded variants,
double-encoding, or Unicode normalization to achieve path traversal and read
configuration files outside the intended directory.
Details
Vulnerable code — Configs.java (line 126)
protected static String validate(String config) {
if (StringUtils.isBlank(config) || config.contains("\\") || config.contains("/")
|| config.contains("..") || config.endsWith(".")) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid config name: " + config);
}
return Strings.CS.appendIfMissing(config.trim(), CONFIG_FILE_ENDING);
}
Weakness
The blacklist blocked literal \, /, .., and trailing . but could
potentially miss:
- URL-encoded variants (
%2e%2e%2f) if decoded after validation - Double-encoded sequences (
%252e%252e%252f) - Unicode normalization bypasses
- The approach relies on string matching rather than canonical path resolution
Impact
- Potential read access to configuration files outside the intended config directory
- Information disclosure of sensitive configuration values
Remediation
Fixed in PR #1292, merged into release 8.39.0.
The blacklist was replaced with an allowlist regex that only permits characters
matching ^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$:
protected static final Pattern VALID_CONFIG_NAME = Pattern.compile("^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$");
protected static String validate(String config) {
if (!VALID_CONFIG_NAME.matcher(config).matches() || config.contains("..") || config.endsWith(".")) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid config name: " + config);
}
return Strings.CS.appendIfMissing(config.trim(), CONFIG_FILE_ENDING);
}
This ensures that any character outside the allowed set — including encoded slashes, percent signs, and Unicode sequences — is rejected before the config name reaches the filesystem.
Tests were added to verify that URL-encoded (%2e%2e%2f), double-encoded
(%252e%252e%252f), and Unicode (U+002F) traversal attempts are blocked.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, deploy a reverse proxy or WAF rule
that rejects requests to /api/configuration/ containing encoded path traversal
sequences.
References
- PR #1292 — validate config name with an allowlist
- Original report: GHSA-wjqm-p579-x3ww
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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