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GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw

MediumCVSS 4.1 / 10
Published May 8, 2026·Last modified May 8, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

Users with the role System-Admin (ROLE_SYSTE_ADMIN) and the permission upload_invoice_template can upload PDF invoice templates, which can call pdfContext.setOption('associated_files', ...) inside the sandboxed Twig render.

This is forwarded to mPDF's SetAssociatedFiles(), whose writer calls file_get_contents($entry['path']) during PDF output and embeds the bytes as a FlateDecode stream in the PDF. Any file readable by the PHP worker is returned to the attacker inside the rendered invoice.

Root cause

  1. src/Twig/SecurityPolicy/StrictPolicy.php:123-128 explicitly whitelists PdfContext::setOption():

    if ($obj instanceof PdfContext) {
        if ($lcm !== 'setoption') { throw ...; }
        return;
    }
    
  2. src/Pdf/MPdfConverter.php keeps associated_files in the pass-through allowlist:

    $allowed = ['mode','format','default_font_size','default_font', ... , 'associated_files','additional_xmp_rdf'];
    

    and then forwards it to mPDF:

    if (array_key_exists('associated_files', $options) && is_array($options['associated_files'])) {
        $associatedFiles = $options['associated_files'];
        unset($options['associated_files']);
    }
    ...
    $mpdf->SetAssociatedFiles($associatedFiles);
    
  3. mPDF 8.3.1 MetadataWriter::writeAssociatedFiles() calls file_get_contents, which respects PHP stream wrappers:

    if (isset($file['path'])) {
        $fileContent = @file_get_contents($file['path']);
    }
    ...
    $filestream = gzcompress($fileContent);
    $this->writer->write('<</Type /EmbeddedFile');
    

The sandbox and the option allowlist were both written defensively (short whitelists, not blacklists), but neither side considered that associated_files is a PDF/A file-embedding feature whose path key is a sink.

Fix

The implemented fix has two aspects:

  1. The PdfContext now works with a strict allow-list, that excludes associated_files
  2. The MPdfConverter now removes any path from the $associatedFiles array, which can still be used by plugins:
        if (\count($associatedFiles) > 0) {
            // remove "path" so mPDF will not use file_get_contents() on local files
            // callers must pre-read and pass the bytes via "content"
            $associatedFiles = array_map(static function ($entry): array {
                if (!\is_array($entry)) {
                    return [];
                }

                if (\array_key_exists('path', $entry)) {
                    unset($entry['path']);
                }

                return $entry;
            }, $associatedFiles);
            $mpdf->SetAssociatedFiles($associatedFiles);
        }

Risk Scores
Base Score
4.1

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.

Threat Intelligence
3.8

Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.

EPSS
0.28%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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