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GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw
No affected components available
Summary
Users with the role System-Admin (ROLE_SYSTE_ADMIN) and the permission upload_invoice_template can upload PDF invoice templates, which can call pdfContext.setOption('associated_files', ...) inside the sandboxed Twig render.
This is forwarded to mPDF's SetAssociatedFiles(), whose writer calls file_get_contents($entry['path']) during PDF output and embeds the bytes as a FlateDecode stream in the PDF. Any file readable by the PHP worker is returned to the attacker inside the rendered invoice.
Root cause
-
src/Twig/SecurityPolicy/StrictPolicy.php:123-128explicitly whitelistsPdfContext::setOption():if ($obj instanceof PdfContext) { if ($lcm !== 'setoption') { throw ...; } return; } -
src/Pdf/MPdfConverter.phpkeepsassociated_filesin the pass-through allowlist:$allowed = ['mode','format','default_font_size','default_font', ... , 'associated_files','additional_xmp_rdf'];and then forwards it to mPDF:
if (array_key_exists('associated_files', $options) && is_array($options['associated_files'])) { $associatedFiles = $options['associated_files']; unset($options['associated_files']); } ... $mpdf->SetAssociatedFiles($associatedFiles); -
mPDF 8.3.1
MetadataWriter::writeAssociatedFiles()callsfile_get_contents, which respects PHP stream wrappers:if (isset($file['path'])) { $fileContent = @file_get_contents($file['path']); } ... $filestream = gzcompress($fileContent); $this->writer->write('<</Type /EmbeddedFile');
The sandbox and the option allowlist were both written defensively (short whitelists, not blacklists), but neither side considered that associated_files is a PDF/A file-embedding feature whose path key is a sink.
Fix
The implemented fix has two aspects:
- The
PdfContextnow works with a strict allow-list, that excludesassociated_files - The
MPdfConverternow removes anypathfrom the$associatedFilesarray, which can still be used by plugins:
if (\count($associatedFiles) > 0) {
// remove "path" so mPDF will not use file_get_contents() on local files
// callers must pre-read and pass the bytes via "content"
$associatedFiles = array_map(static function ($entry): array {
if (!\is_array($entry)) {
return [];
}
if (\array_key_exists('path', $entry)) {
unset($entry['path']);
}
return $entry;
}, $associatedFiles);
$mpdf->SetAssociatedFiles($associatedFiles);
}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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