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GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92
No affected components available
GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369
Summary
SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied property field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...))) SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation.
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 8.8 (High) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Component
- Package:
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle - File:
src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php - Lines: 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point)
- Endpoint:
POST /admin/translation/translations
Description
The translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has type: "date", the property field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression:
$fieldname = $filter[$propertyField]; // Line 565 — user input
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); // Line 569 — trivially bypassable
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname; // Line 577
$fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))"; // Line 593 — injection
The str_replace('--', '') sanitization is trivially bypassable (use /**/ comments or ----). In non-language mode, $fieldname is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization.
Impact
Authenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain.
Proof of Concept
POST /admin/translation/translations
filter=[{"property":"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1","type":"date","operator":"eq","value":"2026-01-01"}]
Suggested Fix
Validate $fieldname against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation:
$allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
if (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) {
continue;
}
References
- CWE-89: SQL Injection
- Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php — different code path)
Suggested Fix
In TranslationController.php: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname}))) with $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname) to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions.
--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
|| $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
continue;
}
+ // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+ $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+ if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (!$languageMode) {
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
}
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
} elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
$operator = '=';
- $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+ // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+ $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
}
Proposed Fix
--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
|| $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
continue;
}
+ // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+ $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+ if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (!$languageMode) {
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
}
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
} elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
$operator = '=';
- $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+ // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+ $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
}
Happy to submit this as a PR against a private fork if that is the preferred workflow.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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