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GHSA-gq9c-wmrm-5hvr

HighCVSS 7.5 / 10
Published Sep 17, 2026·Last modified Sep 17, 2026
Affected Components(3)
Maven logoca.uhn.hapi.fhir/org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli
< 6.9.12
Maven logoca.uhn.hapi.fhir/org.hl7.fhir.validation
< 6.9.12
Maven logoca.uhn.hapi.fhir/org.hl7.fhir.r5
< 6.9.12
Description

Summary

A malformed Smart Health Card (SHC) JWT with zip: "DEF" and an empty or truncated DEFLATE payload causes SHCParser.inflate() to loop forever. This allows an attacker who can submit SHC content for validation to pin a JVM worker thread indefinitely, causing denial of service.

Details

The vulnerable code is in org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java.

decodeJWT() inflates the JWT payload when the header contains "zip":"DEF":

// SHCParser.java:300-302
if ("DEF".equals(res.header.asString("zip"))) {
  payloadJson = inflate(payloadJson);
}

inflate() loops only on !inflater.finished() and does not check inflater.needsInput(), inflater.needsDictionary(), or zero-progress output:

// SHCParser.java:455-468
while (!inflater.finished()) {
  final int count = inflater.inflate(buffer);
  outputStream.write(buffer, 0, count);
}

For empty or truncated raw DEFLATE input, Inflater.inflate() returns 0, finished() remains false, and needsInput() becomes true, producing an infinite tight loop. The same unsafe loop pattern also exists in decompress() at SHCParser.java:410-423.

The validator reaches this path during SHC validation and during file-format detection for SHC-looking input (ResourceChecker.java:115-118).

PoC

Compile the project, then run a minimal local harness that calls:

SHCParser.inflate(new byte[0]);

This never returns. Local verification:

timeout 3s java -cp ... VerifyDoSFindings shcHang
echo $?
# 124 = timeout killed the hung process

A JWT PoC uses:

  • header: Base64URL({"zip":"DEF"})
  • payload: empty or truncated raw DEFLATE bytes
  • signature: arbitrary

Submit the resulting token as SHC content, for example via a .shc file or content beginning with shc:/ that reaches the validator's SHC detection path.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability. A single malformed SHC validation request can consume a worker thread indefinitely. In services that validate uploaded SHC content, a small number of concurrent malformed requests can exhaust all validation workers.

Credits

  • Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
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Risk Scores
Base Score
7.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.63%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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