Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-gm45-99xc-r7wv
Summary
LZ4FrameInputStream allocates two new buffers of the frame's maximum block size, up to 4 MiB each, every time it reads a frame header. Because concatenated frames are read by default, an input made of many minimal empty frames forces about 8 MiB of zeroed heap allocation for every 11 input bytes.
Details
In net.jpountz.lz4.LZ4FrameInputStream.readHeader():
maxBlockSize = frameInfo.getBD().getBlockMaximumSize();
compressedBuffer = new byte[maxBlockSize]; // Reused during different compressions
rawBuffer = new byte[maxBlockSize];
buffer = ByteBuffer.wrap(rawBuffer);
This runs for every frame, and the previous frame's arrays are never reused. A valid 11-byte frame consists of the magic number, FLG 0x60, BD 0x70 (4 MiB blocks), the header checksum, and an immediate end mark. It carries no data, yet triggers the full 8 MiB allocation. new LZ4FrameInputStream(in) reads concatenated frames by default.
In local measurements on JDK 25, 10,000 such frames (110 KB of input) took about 8 seconds of CPU to read, roughly 70 seconds per MiB of input. This was similar under G1, Parallel, Serial and ZGC. A legitimate stream costs orders of magnitude less per input byte.
Impact
Applications that decode attacker-controlled LZ4 frame data with LZ4FrameInputStream can be made to spend large amounts of CPU and GC time relative to the input size. Live heap stays bounded at about 8 MiB and the stream produces no output, so decompressed-size limits do not help. Cost grows linearly with input size, so the practical limit is the compressed input size the application accepts. Availability impact only.
Applications using readSingleFrame = true perform only one allocation and are not affected.
Patch
Fixed in lz4-java 1.11.4. LZ4FrameInputStream now allocates its block buffers only when a block needs them and reuses them across frames, never shrinking them. The content checksum hash and the skippable-frame skip buffer are also reused instead of being created for every frame. Decompression is limited to the current frame's maximum block size.
For older versions, the workaround is to limit the compressed input size accepted from untrusted sources, or use single-frame mode where that is sufficient.
Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.
Drag and drop some file here, or click to select
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard