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GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5

MediumCVSS 5.3 / 10
Published Nov 16, 2026·Last modified Nov 16, 2026
Affected Components(1)
Go logogithub.com/kubeshark/kubeshark
0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0 – 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75
Description

Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand) Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool download_file Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) Patched version: v53.4.0 Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

Summary

The download_file MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied path from the Kubeshark Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied dest on the local filesystem with no validation of dest. An attacker who can influence the MCP tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.kube/config, ~/.bashrc), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints. download_file is registered unconditionally (available in the default, non---allow-destructive posture).

Introduced in

Commit eb7dc42b — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)", 2026-03-04 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~1). An earlier attempt (dbfd17d9) was reverted (a46f05c4) before any release, so no tag before v53.1.0 is affected.

Details

In callDownloadFile (cmd/mcpRunner.go), both path and dest come straight from the tool arguments:

  • dest was passed directly to os.Create(dest) with no confinement — no filepath.Clean, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute paths or ../ traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.
  • path was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.

Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)

The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. But the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default kubeshark tap the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic (credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is not part of this advisory's fix.

Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)

Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install: export_snapshot_pcap → obtain a relative path → download_file with that path and an attacker-chosen dest. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic PCAP and recovered a planted canary Authorization: Bearer … credential from it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.

Impact

  • Integrity (local): arbitrary file write on the machine running kubeshark mcp, as that user.
  • Confidentiality: read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
  • Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).

Severity rationale

Kubeshark scores this 5.3 Medium, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:

  • AV:N → AV:L. The vulnerable component has no network listener the attacker reaches. kubeshark mcp is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.
  • I:H → I:L. The write is confined to paths writable by the user running kubeshark mcp (normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user modification. The attacker also controls where the bytes land, not what they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.
  • A:L → A:N. Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the Hub, or the host; the original A:L is unsupported.

Kubeshark kept C:H: on a default community install the Hub API answers unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept AC:H (the attacker must land an injection in content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), PR:N (download_file is registered unconditionally — no --allow-destructive needed), UI:R (an operator must be driving an agent against kubeshark mcp), and S:U (the impact stays within the local user's authorization scope).

Patches

Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit a76a1920 (PR #1957).

Changes in cmd/mcpRunner.go:

  • dest is resolved through secureDownloadDest and confined to a base directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR); a dest that resolves outside the base (via ../ or an absolute path) is rejected.
  • path is rejected if it contains .. segments.
  • Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked subdirectory inside the base (or a dest that is itself a symlink) cannot redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with O_NOFOLLOW where the platform provides it.
  • Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the gated-auth refactor).

Workarounds

  • Run kubeshark mcp as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.
  • Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
  • Enable Hub authentication (AUTH_ENABLED=true + an IdP/license) to close the unauthenticated read path.

Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)

  • Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub path (current fix only rejects ..).
  • Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).
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Risk Scores
Base Score
5.3

The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
4.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.18%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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