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GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5
Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark
CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand)
Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool download_file
Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the
tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
Patched version: v53.4.0
Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.
Summary
The download_file MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied path from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied dest on the local
filesystem with no validation of dest. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
kubeshark mcp — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
~/.kube/config, ~/.bashrc), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
download_file is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non---allow-destructive posture).
Introduced in
Commit eb7dc42b — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)",
2026-03-04 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~1). An earlier attempt
(dbfd17d9) was reverted (a46f05c4) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.
Details
In callDownloadFile (cmd/mcpRunner.go), both path and dest come straight
from the tool arguments:
destwas passed directly toos.Create(dest)with no confinement — nofilepath.Clean, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute paths or../traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.pathwas concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.
Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)
The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication
gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now
forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and
rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. But
the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default
kubeshark tap the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic
(credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing
Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is not
part of this advisory's fix.
Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)
Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install:
export_snapshot_pcap → obtain a relative path → download_file with that
path and an attacker-chosen dest. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic
PCAP and recovered a planted canary Authorization: Bearer … credential from
it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.
Impact
- Integrity (local): arbitrary file write on the machine running
kubeshark mcp, as that user. - Confidentiality: read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).
Severity rationale
Kubeshark scores this 5.3 Medium, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:
AV:N→AV:L. The vulnerable component has no network listener the attacker reaches.kubeshark mcpis a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.I:H→I:L. The write is confined to paths writable by the user runningkubeshark mcp(normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user modification. The attacker also controls where the bytes land, not what they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.A:L→A:N. Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the Hub, or the host; the originalA:Lis unsupported.
Kubeshark kept C:H: on a default community install the Hub API answers
unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely
readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept AC:H (the attacker must land an injection in
content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), PR:N
(download_file is registered unconditionally — no --allow-destructive
needed), UI:R (an operator must be driving an agent against
kubeshark mcp), and S:U (the impact stays within the local user's
authorization scope).
Patches
Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit
a76a1920
(PR #1957).
Changes in cmd/mcpRunner.go:
destis resolved throughsecureDownloadDestand confined to a base directory (the CWD by default, relocatable viaKUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR); adestthat resolves outside the base (via../or an absolute path) is rejected.pathis rejected if it contains..segments.- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked
subdirectory inside the base (or a
destthat is itself a symlink) cannot redirect the write outside it; the file is opened withO_NOFOLLOWwhere the platform provides it. - Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the gated-auth refactor).
Workarounds
- Run
kubeshark mcpas an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory. - Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
- Enable Hub authentication (
AUTH_ENABLED=true+ an IdP/license) to close the unauthenticated read path.
Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)
- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub
path(current fix only rejects..). - Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).
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The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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