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GHSA-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg
No affected components available
The fix for GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35 (ClickHouse SQL injection via aggregate query parameters) added column name validation to the _aggregateBy method but did not apply the same validation to three other query construction paths in StatementGenerator. The toSortStatement, toSelectStatement, and toGroupByStatement methods accept user-controlled object keys from API request bodies and interpolate them as ClickHouse Identifier parameters without verifying they correspond to actual model columns.
ClickHouse Identifier parameters are substituted directly into queries without escaping, so an attacker who can reach any analytics list or aggregate endpoint can inject arbitrary SQL through crafted sort, select, or groupBy keys.
Details
Root cause
StatementGenerator.ts has four methods that iterate over user-provided object keys to build SQL:
| Method | Validates keys? |
|--------|----------------|
| toWhereStatement (line 292) | Yes - calls this.model.getTableColumn(key) |
| toSortStatement (line 467) | No |
| toSelectStatement (line 483) | No |
| toGroupByStatement (line 451) | No |
In Statement.ts, when a value passed to the SQL tagged template is a string, it receives the Identifier data type (line 40). Per ClickHouse documentation, Identifier parameters are substituted directly into the query without quoting or escaping. This is correct for trusted column names but unsafe for user input.
Input flow
BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts deserializes sort, select, and groupBy directly from req.body (lines 239-253) and passes them to the service layer without column validation:
sort = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["sort"]) as Sort<AnalyticsDataModel>;
select = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["select"]) as Select<AnalyticsDataModel>;
groupBy = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["groupBy"]) as GroupBy<AnalyticsDataModel>;
Affected endpoints
Any endpoint backed by BaseAnalyticsAPI.getList() or BaseAnalyticsAPI.getAggregate() - this includes analytics queries for logs, metrics, spans, and exceptions.
Impact
An authenticated user can inject arbitrary ClickHouse SQL through crafted column names in sort, select, or groupBy request parameters. This allows reading, modifying, or deleting analytics data (logs, metrics, traces) stored in ClickHouse. PostgreSQL data is not affected (separate query path).
Suggested Fix
Add the same getTableColumn() validation already present in toWhereStatement to the three unvalidated methods:
// toSortStatement, toSelectStatement, toGroupByStatement
for (const key in sort) {
if (!this.model.getTableColumn(key)) {
throw new BadDataException(`Unknown column: ${key}`);
}
// existing logic
}
This matches the pattern used in the GHSA-p5g2 fix for _aggregateBy and the existing toWhereStatement validation.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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