Summary

A vulnerability in Apollo Router allowed for unauthorized access to protected data through schema elements with access control directives (@authenticated, @requiresScopes, and @policy) that were renamed via @link imports. Router did not enforce renamed access control directives on schema elements (e.g. fields and types), allowing queries to bypass those element-level access controls.

Details

Apollo Federation allows users to specify access control directives (@authenticated, @requiresScopes, and @policy](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/security/authorization#authorization-directives)) to protect schema data access at the element level. These directives can optionally be renamed via the imports argument to the @link directive, which can be useful if their default names match an existing user-defined directive in their subgraph schema. However, Apollo Router's access control logic ignored the imports argument, and would accordingly ignore access control directives that were renamed in this way.

Who Is Impacted

This vulnerability impacts Apollo Router customers defining @authenticated, @requiresScopes, or @policy directives on schema elements that were renamed via @link imports are impacted.

Scope of Impact

The vulnerability could allow a malicious actor to craft a query that can bypass access control requirements on schema elements protected by renamed access control directives.

Patches

This vulnerability has been fixed in Apollo Router by updating the access control logic to handle the imports argument in @link directives. You will need to update Router to one of the following versions:

• 1.61.12+
• 2.8.1+

Workarounds

• If you are not immediately updating Router to a patched version, you should remove any renames of access control directives in the imports argument to the @link directive.
• Customers not using Apollo Router with renamed access control directives (@authenticated, @requiresScopes, and @policy) are not affected and do not need to take action.