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GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr
No affected components available
Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from servedir.
Due to the use of path.Clean() (which only normalizes forward-slash / separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured servedir root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem.
This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
However:
path.Clean()is POSIX-style and only understands/(docs:https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean)- On Windows,
\is a valid path separator path.Clean()does not treat\as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
If queryPath contains sequences such as:
..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini
path.Clean() will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret \ as directory separators when resolving absPath.
Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within servedir, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.
Vulnerable Code
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
....
// Check for a file in the "servedir" directory
if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry {
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath {
if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil {
if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry {
....
Steps to reproduce
npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version
0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini"
<content of Windows\system.ini>
Impact
- Arbitrary file read on Windows
- Exposure of sensitive files
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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