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GHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr

HighCVSS 7.4 / 10
Published Jul 22, 2026·Last modified Jul 22, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

OcspServerCertificateValidator flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as VALID, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate.

Details

In io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered the freshness check has no return, so execution falls through and a VALID OcspValidationEvent is still fired:

                        if (!(current.after(response.getThisUpdate()) &&
                                current.before(response.getNextUpdate()))) {
                            ctx.fireExceptionCaught(new IllegalStateException("OCSP Response is out-of-date"));
                        }

Nonce validation is optional and off by default, so freshness is the only replay defense — and it is not enforced. Additionally getNextUpdate() may be null, making current.before(null) throw NullPointerException.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6960#section-3.2

   5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be
      correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent;

   6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will
      be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is
      greater than the current time.

PoC

Add the test below to io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidatorTest

    @Test
    void staleOcspResponseIsRejected() throws Exception {
        X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder()
                .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
                .subject("CN=TrustedRootCA")
                .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
                .buildSelfSigned();

        GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, "http://localhost/");
        AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(
                new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName));
        X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder()
                .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
                .subject("CN=TargetServer")
                .addExtensionOctetString("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", false, aia.getEncoded())
                .buildIssuedBy(caRoot);

        Date past = new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() - TimeUnit.DAYS.toMillis(7));
        CertificateID certId = new CertificateID(
                new JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder().build().get(CertificateID.HASH_SHA1),
                new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()),
                targetCert.getCertificate().getSerialNumber());
        BasicOCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new BasicOCSPRespBuilder(
                new RespID(new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()).getSubject()));
        respBuilder.addResponse(certId, CertificateStatus.GOOD, past, past);
        BasicOCSPResp expiredBasicResp = respBuilder.build(
                new JcaContentSignerBuilder("SHA256withRSA").build(caRoot.getKeyPair().getPrivate()),
                new X509CertificateHolder[0],
                past);
        final byte[] responseEncoded = new OCSPRespBuilder()
                .build(OCSPRespBuilder.SUCCESSFUL, expiredBasicResp).getEncoded();

        IoTransport defaultTransport = createDefaultTransport();
        IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(defaultTransport.eventLoop(), () -> {
                NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel();
                channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() {
                    @Override
                    public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress,
                                        SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) {
                        promise.setSuccess();
                        ctx.executor().execute(() -> {
                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive();
                            DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse(
                                    HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK,
                                    Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded));
                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, "application/ocsp-response");
                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH,
                                    httpResponse.content().readableBytes());
                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse);
                        });
                    }
                });
                return channel;
            }, defaultTransport.datagramChannel());

            SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder
                    .forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(),
                            targetCert.getCertificate(), caRoot.getCertificate())
                    .build();
            Channel serverChannel = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc()));
                        }
                    })
                    .bind(0).sync().channel();

            int serverPort = ((InetSocketAddress) serverChannel.localAddress()).getPort();

            AtomicBoolean validEventFired = new AtomicBoolean();
            AtomicReference<Throwable> caughtException = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport);
            SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient()
                    .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)
                    .build();
            new Bootstrap()
                    .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), "127.0.0.1", serverPort));
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(
                                    new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver));
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                @Override
                                public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) {
                                    if (evt instanceof OcspValidationEvent &&
                                            ((OcspValidationEvent) evt).response().status() ==
                                                    OcspResponse.Status.VALID) {
                                        validEventFired.set(true);
                                    }
                                    ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt);
                                }

                                @Override
                                public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                    caughtException.compareAndSet(null, cause);
                                    ctx.channel().close();
                                    latch.countDown();
                                }
                            });
                        }
                    })
                    .connect("127.0.0.1", serverPort).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
            assertFalse(validEventFired.get(),
                    "OcspValidationEvent(VALID) must not be emitted for a stale OCSP response");
            assertNotNull(caughtException.get());
            assertInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class, caughtException.get());

            serverChannel.close().sync();
            resolver.close();
    }

Impact

Certificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using OcspServerCertificateValidator is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted.

Risk Scores
Base Score
7.4

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
6.8

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.14%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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