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GHSA-g5jq-qmqr-qrwf
Summary
In v2.52.1 and v2.52.2 the CORS middleware matched a wildcard origin such as https://*.example.com by suffix only, without a dot boundary and without comparing the scheme. Any origin whose host ends with the base domain, for example https://evil-example.com or http://notexample.com, was reflected in Access-Control-Allow-Origin, together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true when AllowCredentials is enabled.
v2.52.3 replaced the matcher (#2915) and is not affected. The report was filed against v2.52.15, where the dot boundary holds; see "Other versions" below.
Details
v2.52.1 introduced validateDomain in middleware/cors/utils.go (f0cd3b44, part of the fix for GHSA-fmg4-x8pw-hjhg). It strips scheme and port from both sides and then checks only the suffix, with trimmedPattern = "example.com", so the character before the suffix is never checked:
if strings.HasPrefix(normalizedPattern, "*.") {
trimmedPattern := normalizedPattern[2:]
if strings.HasSuffix(normalizedDomain, trimmedPattern) {
if normalizedDomain != trimmedPattern {
if strings.TrimSuffix(normalizedDomain, trimmedPattern) != "" {
return true
}
}
}
}
v2.52.3 (1aac6f61, #2915) replaced it with a scheme-aware prefix/suffix split that keeps the leading dot in the suffix (.example.com).
Proof of concept
app := fiber.New()
app.Use(cors.New(cors.Config{
AllowOrigins: "https://*.example.com",
AllowCredentials: true,
}))
app.Get("/", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error { return c.SendString("secret") })
Request with Origin: https://evil-example.com, as a GET and as a preflight (OPTIONS with Access-Control-Request-Method: GET):
| Version | https://evil-example.com | http://evil-example.com |
|---|---|---|
| v2.52.0 | not allowed | not allowed |
| v2.52.1, v2.52.2 | reflected, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true | reflected, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true |
| v2.52.3 to v2.52.16 | not allowed | not allowed |
Impact
An app that configures a wildcard-subdomain AllowOrigins with AllowCredentials: true lets any page on a domain that ends with the base domain (for example notexample.com for *.example.com) read authenticated responses cross-origin. Fixed in v2.52.3; upgrade to the latest v2 release.
Other versions
All v2 releases before v2.52.16 also accepted origins with empty labels (https://.example.com, https://a..example.com), and v2.52.3 to v2.52.15 mis-parsed a wildcard entry after a comma and a space ("https://a.com, https://*.example.com"). No registrable domain produces such an origin, so these are hardening rather than part of this advisory. They are fixed in v2.52.16 (#4792).
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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