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GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
No affected components available
Summary
The nebula-mgmt Web UI host-creation path ignores both the server-wide enrollment_token_ttl security setting and per-network network_config.enrollment_token_ttl overrides. API host creation and token-regeneration paths use the configured TTL resolver, but POST /ui/hosts hardcodes now.Add(24 * time.Hour) for newly minted agent enrollment tokens. In deployments that intentionally reduce enrollment-token lifetime, any authenticated operator who can create a host through the Web UI can still mint a bearer enrollment token valid for about 24 hours.
Details
Enrollment tokens are bearer credentials for the public POST /api/v1/enroll endpoint: possession of a valid token allows enrolling the pending host and receiving a signed Nebula certificate/config for that host. The server configuration documents a security knob for their default lifetime and per-network overrides:
internal/config/server.go:82definesEnrollmentTokenTTLas the default lifetime for freshly minted enrollment tokens.internal/config/server.go:83documents per-network overrides innetwork_configunderenrollment_token_ttl.
The API server implements and consistently uses this resolver:
internal/api/server.go:77definestokenTTLFor, with precedence of per-networkenrollment_token_ttl, then server default, then 24h fallback.internal/api/server.go:82readsnetwork_config.enrollment_token_ttl.internal/api/server.go:89falls back to the configured server default.internal/api/hosts.go:190throughinternal/api/hosts.go:196usenow.Add(s.tokenTTLFor(r.Context(), host.NetworkID))for API host creation.
The Web UI sibling path does not call the resolver and instead always sets a 24-hour expiry:
internal/web/handlers.go:874mints the raw token forPOST /ui/hosts.internal/web/handlers.go:879setsExpiresAt: now.Add(24 * time.Hour).
This creates inconsistent behavior between API and Web UI host creation and bypasses an operator-configured token lifetime policy. The issue is reachable by an authenticated Web UI operator who can create hosts. Admins can create hosts in any network; non-admin operators can create hosts in networks whose CA they own.
Affected version evidence: the configurable enrollment-token TTL feature was introduced by commit 6c344a6 (feat(api): configurable enrollment-token TTL + regenerate endpoint (#75) (#79)), and git tag --contains 6c344a6 --sort=version:refname returns v0.3.0 through v0.3.8. Pattern checks across all release tags showed the TTL config/API resolver and the Web UI 24-hour hardcode are present in every v0.3.x release from v0.3.0 to v0.3.8, and are not meaningfully applicable to v0.1.x/v0.2.0 because the TTL policy knob was not present there. The current checkout at commit d92dd9a60de291e2bc1caf73b4e9a99567b31ec0 (git describe: v0.3.8-1-gd92dd9a) remains affected.
PoC
Safe local PoC run from a clean checkout at commit d92dd9a60de291e2bc1caf73b4e9a99567b31ec0 on 2026-06-12. The PoC is a temporary Go test that uses only in-memory SQLite and httptest; it does not start a real server and does not contact external services.
- Create a temporary test file
internal/web/security_audit_poc_test.goin packageweb. - In the test, create an in-memory Web UI with
newTestWeb(t), create a networkaudit-poc-netwith CIDR10.77.0.0/24, and setnetwork_config.enrollment_token_ttlto30m. - Log in as the seeded test admin through the normal Web UI helper and obtain a CSRF token from
GET /ui/hosts/new. - Submit
POST /ui/hostswithnetwork_id=audit-poc-net,name=audit-poc-host,nebula_ips=10.77.0.10,role=host, andkind=agent. - Parse the one-shot enrollment token from the returned host-detail page and read the token row with
GetEnrollmentToken. - Compare the observed expiry to the configured 30-minute network override.
Command run:
go test ./internal/web -run 'TestSecurityAuditPOC' -count=1 -v
Observed vulnerable output from this environment:
=== RUN TestSecurityAuditPOC_UIHostCreateIgnoresNetworkEnrollmentTokenTTL
POC_UI_TTL_BYPASS observed_token_ttl=24h0m0s configured_network_ttl=30m expires_at=2026-06-13T14:51:45Z
--- PASS: TestSecurityAuditPOC_UIHostCreateIgnoresNetworkEnrollmentTokenTTL (0.05s)
The meaningful control is the API sibling: internal/api/hosts.go:190 through internal/api/hosts.go:196 uses s.tokenTTLFor(...), and existing tests in internal/api/hosts_token_ttl_test.go verify API-created/regenerated enrollment tokens honor server-default and per-network TTLs. Variant review also found API regenerate-token, API re-enroll, and signed-poll rekey token minting use the resolver rather than a hardcoded 24h value. After recording the output, the temporary test file was removed and git status --short returned clean. The PoC was re-run after drafting this report and produced the output shown above.
Impact
An authenticated Web UI operator can bypass a configured enrollment-token lifetime policy and obtain a token valid for approximately 24 hours even when the deployment or network is configured for a much shorter lifetime such as 30 minutes. Because enrollment tokens are bearer credentials for the public enrollment endpoint, longer-than-intended validity increases the window in which a copied, logged, shared, or otherwise exposed token can be used to enroll the pending host and obtain its Nebula certificate/config. This weakens confidentiality and integrity for deployments relying on short token lifetimes to reduce enrollment-token exposure.
Suggested remediation: refactor the Web UI host-creation path to use the same TTL resolution as the API path, or move the resolver into a shared package/service used by both API and Web UI. Add a regression test under internal/web that sets network_config.enrollment_token_ttl = "30m", creates an agent host through POST /ui/hosts, and asserts the persisted enrollment token expires within the configured 30-minute window rather than 24 hours.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
- CVE-2026-55513Alias
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