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GHSA-g3xq-3gmv-qq8g
No affected components available
Summary
tools/quota-statusline.sh (introduced in v3.5.0) interpolates Claude Code's hook stdin payload directly into a Python triple-quoted string literal. A ''' byte sequence in any user-controlled field of the payload closes the literal early and lets following bytes execute as Python in the user's Claude Code process.
Affected versions
- v3.5.0
- v3.5.1
Patched versions
- v3.5.2
Affected configurations
Users who wired tools/quota-statusline.sh into Claude Code's statusLine configuration. The v3.5.0 README explicitly recommends this setup, so most users on v3.5.0/v3.5.1 with the recommended setup are affected.
Attack chain
Claude Code's statusline hook payload reflects user-controlled paths (cwd, workspace.current_dir, workspace.project_dir, transcript_path). Apostrophes are legal in POSIX filesystem paths.
- A hostile directory name containing
'''+payload+'''lands on disk via any normal vector —git clone, archive extraction, npm package, downloaded zip, etc. - The victim has the recommended
tools/quota-statusline.shwired into their CCstatusLineconfig. - The victim
cds anywhere a hostile path is reachable. - CC fires the statusline hook on every redraw. The Python literal closes early. The injected bytes execute as Python in the user's process.
Severity
Local code execution at user privilege. Persistent re-fire on every statusline redraw. No user interaction beyond cd-ing into the hostile path. The user's shell, CC session, files, SSH keys, and any locally-accessible credentials are reachable from the executed code.
Vulnerable pattern
input=$(cat)
result=$(python3 -c "
stdin_data = json.loads('''$input''') if '''$input''' else {}
")
Fix
Capture stdin in bash, export to env, and pipe the Python source through a single-quoted heredoc (<<'PYEOF'). Single-quoting disables ALL bash interpolation inside the body. Python reads the JSON via os.environ.get('CC_INPUT'), where the bytes are inert at every layer.
CC_INPUT=$(cat)
export CC_INPUT
python3 <<'PYEOF' 2>/dev/null
import os, json
try:
cc_input = json.loads(os.environ.get('CC_INPUT') or '{}')
except Exception:
cc_input = {}
# ...
PYEOF
Workarounds
Until upgrading to v3.5.2:
- Disable the statusline by removing the
statusLineentry from~/.claude/settings.json, or - Replace
tools/quota-statusline.shwith a script that does NOT pass stdin throughpython3 -c "..."(a heredoc + env var rewrite is safe)
Credit
Reported by Jakob Linke (@schuay) via GitHub issue #108.
Timeline
- 2026-05-07 — reported (#108)
- 2026-05-07 — confirmed, fix implemented (#110)
- 2026-05-07 — v3.5.2 published
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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