Open-Source Security Intelligence

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.

DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.

Search

GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g

MediumCVSS 4.3 / 10
Published May 13, 2026·Last modified May 13, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

The advisory GHSA-c77m-r996-jr3q patched getBookmark so that, when invoked by a publish-mode RoleReader, results are filtered through FilterBlocksByPublishAccess to remove entries from password-protected / publish-ignored notebooks. Four sibling search handlers in the same file did not receive the equivalent treatment and continue to expose metadata across the publish-access boundary.

Details

Affected files / lines (v3.6.5):

kernel/api/router.go:181-190 — all four endpoints registered with CheckAuth only, which the publish-service RoleReader JWT passes:

ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTag",      model.CheckAuth, searchTag)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTemplate", model.CheckAuth, searchTemplate)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchWidget",   model.CheckAuth, searchWidget)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchAsset",    model.CheckAuth, searchAsset)

kernel/api/search.go — none of the four handlers branches on model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) to filter the response, while their peers in the same file do. Compare:

// :29-65  listInvalidBlockRefs — DOES filter:
if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {
    publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()
    blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)
}

// :67-93  getAssetContent — DOES filter (FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess)
// :95-115 fullTextSearchAssetContent — DOES filter
// :250-285 getEmbedBlock — DOES filter (FilterEmbedBlocksByPublishAccess)

// :156-176 searchAsset — does NOT filter
ret.Data = model.SearchAssetsByName(k, exts)

// :178-196 searchTag — does NOT filter
tags := model.SearchTags(k)
ret.Data = map[string]any{"tags": tags, "k": k}

// :198-213 searchWidget — does NOT filter
widgets := model.SearchWidget(keyword)

// :233-248 searchTemplate — does NOT filter
templates := model.SearchTemplate(keyword)

model.SearchAssetsByName, model.SearchTags, model.SearchWidget, model.SearchTemplate operate over the entire workspace database / filesystem, not just the publish-visible subset. A FilterTagsByPublishIgnore helper already exists in kernel/model/ and is used by getTag itself (kernel/api/tag.go:58-62), confirming the maintainers' intent.

PoC

End-to-end reproduction requires enabling the SiYuan publish service, marking one notebook as private to publish access, and obtaining a RoleReader JWT from the publish reverse-proxy (per kernel/server/proxy/publish.go). Once authenticated as the Reader against the publish port:

# Returns ALL tags across the workspace, including ones drawn only from the publish-private notebook.
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTag \
     -H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -d '{"k":""}'

# Returns ALL asset filenames (e.g., CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx) regardless of source notebook.
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchAsset \
     -H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -d '{"k":""}'

curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchWidget   -H '...' -d '{"k":""}'
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTemplate -H '...' -d '{"k":""}'

Each call returns the global result set without applying FilterTagsByPublishIgnore / FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess / equivalent.

In this audit I source-confirmed the missing branch in v3.6.5 but did not stand up the full publish-service flow. The fix is straightforward enough that the source-level evidence should be sufficient for triage.

Impact

A publish-service Reader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors by default) can enumerate:

  • All tag strings used anywhere in the workspace — frequently contains person names, project codenames, internal identifiers.
  • All asset filenames uploaded to the workspace — frequently contains the contents of CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx, etc.
  • All widget names and template names installed in the workspace.

This violates the publish-service trust boundary. Users intentionally mark notebooks as "invisible to publish" specifically to keep this metadata out of public reach.

Risk Scores
Base Score
4.3

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.

Threat Intelligence
4.0

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.22%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Browse More

Scan your project

Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.

Checkout DevGuard