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GHSA-fc3h-c6h7-r83j
No affected components available
In plain terms, Apache Polaris is supposed to issue short-lived GCS credentials that only work for one table's files, but a crafted namespace or table name can cause those credentials to work across the configured bucket instead.
Apache Polaris builds Google Cloud Storage downscoped credentials by creating a Credential Access Boundary (CAB) with CEL conditions that are intended to restrict access to the requested table's storage path.
The relevant CEL string is built from the bucket name and the table path. That table path is derived from namespace and table identifiers. In current code, that path appears to be inserted into the CEL expression without escaping.
As a result, a namespace or table identifier containing a single quote and other URI-safe CEL fragments can break out of the intended quoted string and change the meaning of the CEL condition.
In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 on real Google Cloud Storage, it was confirmed that Polaris accepted a crafted identifier and returned delegated GCS credentials whose CEL path restriction had effectively collapsed.
Those delegated credentials could then:
- list another table's object prefix
- read another table's metadata control file (Iceberg metadata JSON);
- create and delete an object under another table's object prefix;
- and also list, read, create, and delete objects under an unrelated external prefix in the same bucket that was not part of any table path.
That last point is important. The issue is not limited to "another table". In the confirmed setup, once Apache Polaris returned credentials for the crafted table, the path restriction inside the configured bucket was effectively gone.
The practical effect is that temporary credentials for one crafted table can be broader than the table Polaris was asked to authorize, and can become effectively bucket-wide within the configured bucket.
The current GCS testing used a Polaris principal with broad catalog privileges for setup. A separate least-privilege Polaris RBAC variant has not yet been tested on GCS. However, the storage-credential broadening behavior itself has been confirmed on GCS.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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