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GHSA-f7pm-6hr8-7ggm
No affected components available
Summary
When allowed_origins is configured, CheckAllowedOrigins reduces URL-like values to their host component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored.
Details
CheckAllowedOrigins stores each configured allowed origin as:
parse_url($allowedOrigin)['host'] ?? $allowedOrigin
and later reduces the received clientDataJSON.origin the same way:
parse_url($C->origin)['host'] ?? $C->origin
If the reduced value matches, the method returns early. As a result, for the normal allowed_origins path, the later HTTPS check is not reached.
This differs from WebAuthn Level 2, which requires verifying that C.origin matches the RP's origin (scheme + host + port), separately from verifying that authData.rpIdHash matches the expected RP ID.
Affected code:
Spec references:
- §7.1 Registering a New Credential
- §7.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion
- CollectedClientData.origin
PoC
Configuration:
webauthn:
allowed_origins:
- https://login.example.com:8443
allow_subdomains: false
Send a registration or authentication response whose clientDataJSON.origin is:
https://login.example.com:9443
Observed: the response is accepted, because both values are reduced to login.example.com.
Expected: the response should be rejected, because https://login.example.com:8443 and https://login.example.com:9443 are different origins.
Impact
This is an origin validation error (CWE-346) affecting deployments that use allowed_origins. The most practical browser-facing scenario is same-host / different-port origin confusion. In non-browser or custom clients, scheme confusion may also be relevant.
Fix
Fixed in version 5.2.4 by rewriting CheckAllowedOrigins to perform full origin comparison (scheme + host + port) as required by the WebAuthn spec:
- Origins configured with a scheme (e.g.
https://example.com:8443) are now stored and compared as fullscheme://host[:port]values, with default port normalization (443 for HTTPS, 80 for HTTP). - Origins configured without a scheme are still matched by host only, for backward compatibility.
- Subdomain matching now also verifies scheme and port consistency.
See commit b4cd9a43.
Mitigation
Upgrade to web-auth/webauthn-framework (or web-auth/webauthn-lib / web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle) >= 5.2.4.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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