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GHSA-f67j-2jqw-jpq7
@angular/platform-server@angular/platform-server@angular/platform-serverA Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in @angular/platform-server's DOM emulation parser (domino). When processing untrusted user input containing an incomplete DOCTYPE declaration ending with whitespace before EOF (such as <!DOCTYPE html ), the HTML parser enters an infinite synchronous loop, pegging CPU utilization at 100% and completely freezing the Node.js server process.
Technical Description
In Angular Server-Side Rendering (SSR), @angular/platform-server uses domino to parse and sanitize HTML bound through template bindings (such as [innerHTML]) or manipulated via DOM APIs.
In Domino's HTML parser (lib/HTMLParser.js), tokenizer states that specify fixed lookahead—such as after_doctype_name_state (lookahead = 6)—rely on the state handler function to explicitly advance the character index pointer (nextchar). While branches for whitespace, >, and keyword matching advance nextchar, the EOF branch (case -1: // EOF) emitted doctype and EOF tokens without advancing nextchar or transitioning out of the state:
case -1: // EOF
forcequirks();
emitDoctype();
emitEOF();
break;
Because nextchar remained unchanged pointing to the EOF marker character (\uFFFF), the scanner loop (while (nextchar < numchars)) repeatedly re-invoked after_doctype_name_state with codepoint = EOF indefinitely. In Node.js's single-threaded runtime, this synchronous loop starves the event loop entirely.
Impact & Reachability
- Reachability: The vulnerability is reachable in any Angular SSR application where untrusted user input is bound to
[innerHTML], interpolated into markup, or sanitized on the server. - Impact: Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause an immediate Denial of Service (DoS) by sending a payload containing an incomplete DOCTYPE (e.g.,
<!DOCTYPE html). The Node.js SSR process locks up at 100% CPU and ceases responding to all concurrent and subsequent HTTP requests.
Proof of Concept:
import { Component } from '@angular/core';
@Component({
selector: 'app-root',
standalone: true,
template: `<div [innerHTML]="payload"></div>`,
})
export class AppComponent {
// Attacker-controlled input containing an incomplete DOCTYPE ending with whitespace
payload = '<!DOCTYPE html ';
}
Workarounds
- Avoid binding untrusted user input directly to
[innerHTML]in server-rendered templates; use standard text interpolation ({{ userInput }}) or[textContent]when raw HTML rendering is not required. - Validate or sanitize user input before passing it to
[innerHTML]on the server by stripping or rejecting strings matching/^<!DOCTYPE/i.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
- CVE-2026-101895Alias
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