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GHSA-cqgh-8p3p-mx4m
Summary
com.rabbitmq.tools.json.JSONReader.read() never returns when its input ends inside a quoted string or a // line comment. Both scanners walk the input with StringCharacterIterator.next() but only compare against a delimiter, so once the iterator reaches CharacterIterator.DONE () they loop forever. The string scanner (string(), line 210, while (c != sep)) also appends to a StringBuilder every iteration, so it fills the heap and throws OutOfMemoryError, taking down the JVM. The comment scanner (skipWhiteSpace(), lines 89-92, while (c != '\n')) pins a thread at 100% CPU with no allocation.
This is reachable with a single message. JsonRpcServer and JsonRpcClient fall back to DefaultJsonRpcMapper whenever no mapper is passed (JsonRpcServer.java:84 and :114, JsonRpcClient.java:186), and that mapper hands the raw message body straight to JSONReader.read() (DefaultJsonRpcMapper.java:42 for the server request, :52 for the client reply). A caller that can publish to the RPC request queue hangs the server; a malicious or MITM'd JSON-RPC service does the same to a client.
Proof of concept
Against amqp-client 5.36.0 from Maven Central:
import com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpc.DefaultJsonRpcMapper;
public class Poc {
public static void main(String[] args) {
DefaultJsonRpcMapper mapper = new DefaultJsonRpcMapper();
mapper.parse("{\"method\":\"x", String.class); // unterminated string
// mapper.parse("//", String.class); // unterminated // comment
System.out.println("unreachable");
}
}
java -Xmx64m -cp amqp-client-5.36.0.jar:. Poc throws OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space in about 0.1s and never prints. Swapping in the // line spins at 100% CPU and never returns. A well-formed body such as {"method":"x"} returns immediately.
Impact
Availability. One small, unauthenticated message stops a JSON-RPC endpoint: the unterminated string exhausts the heap, the unterminated comment pins a thread forever. Neither is recoverable per request - JsonRpcServer.doCall only catches ClassCastException, and an OutOfMemoryError affects the whole process.
Scope and fix
Only applications using the JSON-RPC-over-AMQP tooling (com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpc) with the default DefaultJsonRpcMapper are affected. DefaultJsonRpcMapper and JSONReader are deprecated in favour of JacksonJsonRpcMapper, but both still ship and remain the default when no mapper is supplied. The fix is to stop both loops at CharacterIterator.DONE.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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